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Abstract 
 
This piece sets out to evaluate the actions of the Washington, D.C. school authorities 
in response to the Bolling decision of May 1954. It assesses the steps taken towards 
desegregation and the motivations behind them, placing these into context by first 
reviewing the previous actions of both the Superintendent, the Board of Education, 
and their predecessors in the years building up to this decision under the legally 
imposed racially-segregated system. This is primarily achieved through the forensic 
cross-examination of contributions made by these actors in meetings, reports, and 
public statements across several years in the build-up to ‘desegregation’. 
 
Ultimately, several conclusions are drawn. Firstly, that authorities in Washington, 
D.C. behaved in a similar way to those in northern metropolises by not openly 
defying the Court order, but equally doing the bare minimum to comply and taking no 
measures to actively integrate its school system. Secondly, that the Superintendent 
of Schools and various white-majorities of the Board consistently and deliberately 
acted to place the comfort and superiority of white students above the educational 
needs of black students both before and after ‘desegregation’, and that these ideas 
were rooted in the same ideas of white supremacy’s ‘naturalness’ as in the northern 
metropolises experiencing similar demographic shifts. Finally, that at least partly due 
to a lack of active integratory measures taken by the authorities, the Washington 
D.C. public schools were never integrated to any meaningful extent. 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 2 
 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 
 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................................... 4 
 
Chapter I: Washington, D.C. and “The South”........................................................................... 5 
 
Chapter II: The Brown Decisions in Practice: Obfuscation and Implementation 
across the Nation ................................................................................................................................... 11 
 
Chapter III: Structures of Governance Erected, Structures of Schoolhouses 
Neglected: The Origins and Impacts of Washington D.C.’s Peculiar Public 
School Management ............................................................................................................................. 25 
 
Chapter IV: 1947-1954, Actors and Administration: Decision-Making and 
Maintaining Rigid Segregation in a Fluid City ...................................................................... 41 
 
Chapter V: Hollow Promises of Hope: The Response to Bolling and the 
District’s “Desegregation Plan” ..................................................................................................... 57 
 
Chapter VI: The Impact and Import of the Deliberate Continuation of Public 
School Segregation in Washington, D.C.  …………………………….…………………………75 
 
 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................. 79 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
I: Washington, D.C. and “The South” 
 
Little attention has been given to examining how the systems of administration in D.C. public 
education operated in the peculiar structural circumstances of the District. Those few that have 
examined such questions, such as Joseph Drew, have drawn their conclusions almost entirely 
from newspaper archives. Drew’s focus was also on the financial, and therefore on Congress 
and the District Commissioners.1 Others, such as Steven J. Diner have done excellent work in 
pointing out how the dysfunction between nodes of authority in D.C. education is a “natural 
outgrowth” of their divided responsibilities and caused inherent structural issues in the school 
system, but have focussed more on the macro: the broad strokes of the structures themselves 
rather than the actors within them.2 While enriching these existing strands with new primary 
source evidence, this piece also addresses the distinct lack of literature which seeks to analyse 
the specific role of the D.C. Board of Education and its Superintendent of Education, who were 
responsible for the actual manifest running of the schools on a day-to-day and term-by-term 
basis. This study seeks to begin to fill this gap, using Board of Education minutes and other 
private communications and internal administrative documents to explain how structural factors 
combined with the actions of potential agents of change such as the Board and Superintendents 
to shape the nature of the segregated school system in D.C., and subsequently the nature of its 
“desegregation”. This study also seeks to establish that though D.C.’s esotericism of course 
made its particular brand of “desegregation” unique, the broad characteristics of -and approach 
of the authorities to- “desegregation” in D.C. was similar to large northern cities, and that D.C. 
was “northern” in this sense due to its similar positioning as a recipient of significant in-migration 
from the Black South, resulting in drastic demographic shifts. The focus on the municipal actors- 
the Board and Superintendent- facilitates such inter-municipal comparatives. In this regard, this 
study attempts to place the D.C. school “desegregation” into the established literature of 
“northern” school desegregation, such as the works of Jeanne Theoharis and Davison M. 
Douglas, while disputing early conclusions such as those by June Shagaloff in 1963 that in such 
 
1 Joseph S. Drew, ‘Recurring Themes of Educational Finance in the History of Washington, D.C., 1804-
1982’, District of Columbia University, Studies in D.C. History, Policy Paper No. 3, 
<https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED218376.pdf>, [accessed 13/05/2019], p.3. 
2 Steven J. Diner, ‘The Governance of Education in the District of Columbia: An Historical Analysis of 
Current Issues’, Studies in D.C. History and Public Policy Paper No. 2 (1982), University of the District of 
Columbia, <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED218375> [accessed 20/01/2019], P. ii.  
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cities schooling was “obviously only segregated solely because of housing patterns”.3 In D.C., 
as in elsewhere and in particular in northern metropolises, the maintenance of segregation and 
superior white education at the expense of black education was a choice: one consistently 
reinforced by the decisions of administrators. 
 
It is not unreasonable in a geographic sense, given its location, to describe Washington, D.C. as 
“southern”. It is an enclave surrounded by two former Confederate states which held onto the 
institution of slavery with an iron-shackle grip until defeat in the Civil War forced them to no 
longer practice and profit from black enslavement. The capital district is just over the southern 
side of the Mason-Dixon line and thus It may also be tempting, as Brett Gadsden has pointed 
out, to describe border-adjacent localities such as DC’s as being “a world between” North and 
South.4 
 
However, in any analysis of segregation and desegregation in the District of Columbia, a further 
question must be asked: whether Washington, D.C. can be considered “southern” -or indeed a 
“middle ground”- in its race relations and as part of that, whether there are race relations and 
patterns of discrimination which are uniquely and intractably “southern”. The complex reality is 
that as many historians have highlighted, that the South is a large and hugely internally-
divergent region. Race relations are often peculiar to the hyperlocal and subregional units of 
analysis: cities and rural areas behave differently with regard to race, as do different cities and 
different towns, different states, counties, and even different neighbourhoods. 
 
It is hence crucial in any understanding of the racial history of Washington, D.C., to analyse and 
evaluate the construction of the racial history of “The South”, and particularly to examine the 
notion of a uniquely southern racism, often termed “southern exceptionalism” into which 
Washington’s geographic location makes it likely to be assumed to neatly fit. 
 
By the mid twentieth century it became clear among historians that there was no “solid south”, 
as V.O. Key proved as early as 1949; the South contained multitudes.5 C. Vann Woodward’s 
 
3 June Shagaloff, ‘A Review of Public School Desegregation in the North and West’, The Journal of 
Educational Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 6 (Feb, 1963), pp. 292-296. 
4 Brett Gadsden, Between North and South: Delaware, Desegregation, and the Myth of American 
Sectionalism, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), pp. 7-8. 
5 Chandler Davidson, Race and Class in Texas Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1992), p. 3.  
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demonstration in “The Strange Career of Jim Crow” of the “origins of legal segregation in the 
antebellum North” further muddied the narrative waters of the South’s relationship to the North. 
6A new generation of historians began to even more firmly refute the idea of southern 
exceptionalism in the 1960s. The anthology “The Southerner as American” put forward a thesis 
which attacked the narrative of “national innocence” in relation to racism. Howard Zinn then 
argued succinctly and summatively in his “The Southern Mystique” in 1964 that racism was a 
national reality, rather than simply southern.7 
 
Historians have since rebuilt a framework for understanding race relations and segregation in 
America to replace that of strict sectionalism which these most recent forebears had torn down. 
Many turned their attentions to localised studies outside the South, in order to illuminate the 
previously unexamined finer textures of segregation there and begin to work to fill in what 
Thomas Sugrue has labelled a “forgotten history”.8 In doing this, historians have simultaneously 
deconstructed a myth of southern or northern essentialism: that a locality’s race relations and 
patterns of segregation are determined primarily by its geographical northernness or 
southernness. These localised studies have produced what Jeanne Theoharis has described as 
an “avalanche” of scholarship outside of the South in recent decades, and though it has yet to 
filter through to public consciousness or make as big a dent as is necessary in the wealth of 
simplified, southern-centric academic literature, the geographic complexities of American racism 
are now appreciated in the historiography of the Civil Rights Movement.9 
 
The popular narrative of Civil Rights post-Brown tends to be a saviour narrative rooted in the 
misinformed concept of southern exceptionalism. The lens through which the ‘classic’ period of 
Civil Rights (1954-65), into which the timeline of the desegregation of the DC school system 
neatly fits, is that of an enlightened, distinct, and superior North attempting to drag the 
regressive, racist ‘South’ kicking and screaming into sharing its supposedly egalitarian racial 
attitudes and practices. Much of the early analysis of the Civil Rights Movement was heavily 
 
6 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Third Edition), (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1974).  
7 Howard Zinn, ‘The Southern Mystique’, The American Scholar, Vol. 33, No. 1, (1964), pp. 49-56. 
8 Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North, (New York: 
Random House, 2008).   
9 Jeanne Theoharis,  A More Beautiful and Terrible History: The Uses and Misuses of Civil Rights History, 
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2018), p. 33. 
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orientated towards the South.10 It is therefore unsurprising that much of the American popular 
memory of civil rights and segregation is also focussed on the South.  The cause lies in the 
relationship between the founding ‘American Dream’ on which the nation’s identity is built: that 
all are created equal and free to pursue their best life, which then leads to the modern 
“American Dilemma” as highlighted by Gunnar Myrdal in his 1944 study of American race 
relations. Myrdal underscored the incongruity of this founding myth with the reality of the  
restricted social, political, and economic existence of black people in America. These two 
irreconcilable truths thus required a cognitive dissonance in the popular mindset: The rest of the 
nation needed a lightning rod, through which they could conduct, and to which they could 
confine, the entirety of the nation’s racial ills. The South, with its more brash, legally overt forms 
of segregation was the natural choice to become as Griffin and Doyle observed “a repository for 
America’s problems”.11 This is of course not to say that the South is some kind of victim of 
framing, or that the South was not virulently and brutally racist. Simply that it was not the lone 
walled outpost of mid-Century American racism; it is “not to absolve the South but implicate the 
Nation”.12  
The national character of American racism has its roots long before segregation and in the 
institution of slavery. As Farrow, Lang, and Frank have deftly laid out, the North was just as 
“complicit” in slavery as the South, as though it managed to generally achieve the same 
cognitive dissonance which would be required later in order to cope with the mid-20th Century 
“American Dilemma”.13  
 
Dismantling of the idea of the South as a monolith- as the evil racist part of the otherwise 
racially harmonious USA- is not to say that the South and the North were or are the same in the 
way their racism manifests, but rather to decry regional moral relativism and assert that the best 
historical analyses of race relations should centre on the specific undulations of the locality, 
rather than the region, which tends to be “the most popular but also the most imprecise scale of 
 
10 Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino (eds.), The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism” (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
11 Larry J. Griffin and Don H. Doyle, eds., The South as an American Problem, (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 1995), p. 8. 
12 Matthew Lassiter and Joseph Crespino, ‘Introduction’ in The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism,  
Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino (eds.),(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 14 
13 Anne Farrow, Jenifer Frank, and Joel Lang, Complicity: How the North Promoted, Prolonged, and 
Profiteered from Slavery, (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005). 
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analysis”.14 Ultimately northern communities were not necessarily any less racist or less 
segregated than those in the south.  
 
The presence of official policies of segregation have been well-established by historians as 
being present in schools throughout the entire country.  In the West of the United States, only in 
1947 did a Supreme Court decision in Mendez v. Westminster outlaw the century-old practice of 
segregating Mexican-American children into ‘remedial’ schools in California.15 In the North, 
Davison M. Douglas has highlighted the prevalence of government-sponsored school 
segregation through the assignment of black children to separate schools or classrooms 
“persisted in open defiance of state law” well into the 1950s and “most northern states engaged 
in school segregation at some point”.16 While the exact chronologies vary, with some states 
such as Iowa, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey ending their practices of separating 
black and white children into different schools well before the end of the nineteenth Century , 
many continued much later. Communities in Ohio, as well as others in New Jersey and 
elsewhere continued to openly, officially segregate their schools until as late as the mid-1950s.17 
Work done by Brett Gadsden has also accounted for similar patterns of legal school segregation 
in Delaware, an apparent ‘border’ state between North and South, where right up until 1954, the 
state maintained legally separate and manifestly unequal schools, such to the extent that it 
needed to be, as in the case of Washington, D.C., overturned one of the companion cases to 
Brown in 1954- Gebhart v. Belton.18 These ideas of “de jure” and “de facto” made little 
difference to the parents of the small black child barred from attending a decent school, be it 
through overt policy or indirectly through processes such as redlining.19 “De jure” and “de facto” 
were both equally deprivational, and equally racist. As a strong scholarly consensus has 
asserted, the broad, sweeping contrasts which are often made between the “de facto” state of 
 
14 Lassiter and Crespino, ‘Introduction’ in “Myth of Southern Exceptionalism”, p.18. 
15 Francisco Macias, ‘Before Brown v. Board of Education There Was Mendez v. Westminster’, Library of 
Congress Blogs, <https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2014/05/before-brown-v-board-of-education-there-was-
mendez-v-westminster/?loclr=bloglaw>, [accessed 01/07/2019]. 
16 Davison M. Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North: The Battle of Northern School Desegregation, 1865-
1954, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 237-273. 
17 Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North, pp. 3-4. 
18 Gadsden, Between North and South. 
19 John Yinger, Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination, (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1997). ; Jan Ondrich, Stephen Ross, and John Yinger, ‘Geography of 
Housing Discrimination’, Journal of Housing Research, Vol. 12, Issue 2 (2001). 
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segregation outside of the South and the actual segregation of the South are artificial and serve 
as “exculpatory language” for deliberate, continued racial imbalance in schooling.20  
 
While scholars have extensively mapped and painstakingly explained the nature of supposed 
“de facto” housing segregation as being deliberate and malicious, “most urban and suburban 
historians” until relatively recently appeared to have “halted at the schoolhouse door”: a practice 
this piece hopes to help remedy.21    
 
Any presentation of the South as a villainous bogeyman and the North as a paragon of racial 
harmony ignores the reality and ignores their intricacies.. Any assumption that D.C. is a part of a 
blanket South- or even a liminal space adjacent to a blanket South- would also be reductive and 
neglect other aspects of the city’s character which shaped its specific race relations: its status 
as an urban metropolitan centre, as a ward of the federal government, as a city experiencing 
significant black migration, and its location in the ‘Upper South’ and therefore a different 
geographic region to Alabama, Mississippi et al.- to name but a few. These factors combined to 
create by the mid-twentieth century a form of race relations uniquely shaped by “powerful but 
lowkey segregationists”.22 Equally dangerous is viewing D.C. through an entirely national lens. 
Inviewing the black freedom struggle through an entirely national lens, there is the risk of 
“flattening” the local and regional character which of course helped shape individual episodes of 
that struggle, as Clarence Lang has underscored. Lang also points out the “complex heritage” of 
the border South, and stresses that “this varied in expression across individual cases”.23 Any 
effective and rigorous analysis of school (de)segregation in Washington must therefore use the 
 
20 For quote on “exculpatory language”, see: Matthew D. Lassiter, ‘De Jure/ De Facto Segregation: The 
Long Shadow of a National Myth’ in The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism by Lassiter and Crespino 
(eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 29-47, p. 29. 
Further examples of such scholarship include: Brian Purnell, Fighting Jim Crow in the County of Kings: 
The Congress of Racial Equality in Brooklyn (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2013). ; 
Andrew R. Highsmith and Ansley T. Erickson, ‘Segregation as Splitting, Segregation as Joining: Schools, 
Housing, and the Many Modes of Jim Crow’, American Journal of Education, Vol. 121, No. 4 (2015), 563-
595. ; Ansley T. Erickson, Making the Unequal Metropolis: School Desegregation and Its Limits, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). ; Matthew D. Lassiter, ‘Schools and Housing in 
Metropolitan History: An Introduction,’ Journal of Urban History, Vol. 38, no. 2, (2012).   
21 Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993). ; Jack Dougherty, ‘Shopping for Schools: How Public Education and 
Private Housing Shaped Suburban Connecticut’, Journal of Urban History, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2012), p. 207. 
22 Chris Myers Asch and George Derek Musgrove, Chocolate City: A History of Race and Democracy in 
the Nation’s Capital, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), p. 290. 
23 Clarence Lang, ‘Locating the Civil Rights Movement: An Essay on the Deep South, Midwest, and 
Border South in Black Freedom Studies’, Journal of Social History, (Vol. 47, No.2, Winter 2013), pp. 371-
400. 
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municipality as its primary unit of analysis, with comparisons and contrasts to be made to other 
municipal units. 
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II: The Brown decisions in practice: Obfuscation and Implementation 
across the Nation 
 
It is widely acknowledged (in the academic literature, though lamentably less so in the public 
discourse around race in the United States) that in the years and generations after the Supreme 
Court ruled segregated education unconstitutional in the Brown decisions of the mid-1950s, 
segregated schooling persisted. Only 10.8% of students in the seventeen states immediately 
affected by the decisions attended desegregated schools ten years on.24 In the former 
Confederate states of the South, only 1.17% of black students attended school with white peers 
by 1964.25 Though the legal evisceration of dual school systems represented a significant 
technical victory and armed activists across the nation with the useful stick of legal precedent 
with which to beat intransigent, racist school boards in future legal cases, the extent to which 
Brown et al. was a practical victory for black children and their education was extremely limited, 
something which Gerald Rosenberg has pointed out in describing the Court as “constrained” in 
its ability to affect widespread social change.26 There is wide recognition of the widespread 
opposition to school integration in the South, particularly the Deep South, in both the academic 
record and public discourse, including recent analysis of the role of white femininity and 
motherhood in racial conservatism and maintaining racial segregation, and a localised analysis 
of the maintenance of segregation in Alabama.27 It must be underscored that even in resisting 
Brown, the South was not monolithic- as Anders Walker has highlighted- state officials in places 
such as North Carolina, Mississippi, and Florida offered resistance less ‘massive’ and less 
sensationalist than elsewhere. This resistance was still clear in its attempts to preserve 
segregation, simply less vulgar.28 Remarkably little attention has been given until recently to a 
more insidious but equally virulent resistance to desegregating public school systems outside of 
 
24 Alan B. Anderson and George W. Pickering, Confronting The Color Line: The Broken Promise of the 
Civil Rights Movement in Chicago, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986), p. 71. 
25 Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial 
Reform, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 96. 
26 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993). 
27 Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. and Charles D. Bullock III, ‘School Desegregation: A Policy Analysis’, Journal of 
Black Studies, Vol. 4, No, 4, (1972), pp. 410-411; Theoharis, A More Beautiful and Terrible History, pp. 
31-33. ; Elizabeth Gillespie McRae, Mothers of Massive Resistance: White Women and the Politics of 
White Supremacy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018) ; Vivian G. Morris and Curtis L. Morris, The 
Price They Paid: Desegregation in an African American Community, (New York: Teachers College Press, 
2002). 
28 Anders Walker, The Ghost of Jim Crow: How Southern Moderates Used Brown v. Board of Education 
to Stall Civil Rights, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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the ‘othered’ South. Though the concept of ‘southern exceptionalism’ was undeniably a myth, it 
was a powerful one. This myth shaped attitudes in the non-South so strongly that it became the 
defining factor in communities’ and officials’ analyses of their own school systems across the 
non-South: “this is not Birmingham” became the assuager of any guilt or doubts about the 
virtuousness of northern school systems: If racism was not in the form of pitchforks and burning 
crosses, it was not racism. 29  This attitude was near-universal outside the ‘South’, with the result 
that: 
“by 1954, most urban and suburban school districts outside the southern states operated 
nominally ‘colorblind’ neighbourhood school systems, anchored in racially segregated 
housing patterns and gerrymandered attendance zones, often combined with “freedom 
of choice” transfer policies that allowed white students to escape majority-black or 
majority-latino facilities”.30 
 
Though this situation was extant in the northern school schools before 1954, as overt legal 
segregation was largely eradicated in the years before Brown, this same approach and rhetoric 
would be taken after the Washington, D.C., public school system was officially “desegregated” 
in 1954-56: an attitude of “colorblindness” and “neighbourhood” schooling which would continue 
segregation in every meaningful sense, as almost every mechanism in place to avoid school 
integration in other public school systems in the North at the start of the 1950s- and throughout- 
was present in D.C. after 1954. Washington was geographically southern, but then again so 
was Los Angeles (latitudinally, the latter is further South than the University of Mississippi: ‘Ole 
Miss’). However, D.C. officials as in Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago amongst others, were 
informed in their practices and attitudes towards school integration by their not being in the 
Deep South, and, crucially, their being in the “North” in terms of their not being in the 
constructed “South”, as well as in the dynamics of the Great Migration. 
 
The process of achieving meaningful integration- in which black and white children’s schooling 
would be of universally-equal high quality and an allocation of resources removed from racial 
considerations- was a question of the active over the passive. As Matthew Lassiter has argued 
convincingly, the Court decisions in the Brown cases, along with the “artificial dichotomy” 
 
29 Jeanne Theoharis, ‘Hidden in Plain Sight: The Civil Rights Movement outside the South’ in The Myth of 
Southern Exceptionalism, Ed. by Lassiter and Crespino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 48-
68, (p. 50). 
30 Lassiter, ‘De Facto/ De Jure’, p. 30. 
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between de jure and de facto school segregation, facilitated and justified a passivity among 
local authorities, particularly notably so (and most relevant to the nature of the situation in 
Washington, D.C.) in metropolitan areas.31 Derrick Bell has underscored this failure of the 
Brown decisions to take account of the wider causes of school segregation: implementing no 
plans or deadlines, and therefore failing to properly address it.32 The wording of the Brown 
decisions, engineered to overturn the six-decade-old Plessy precedent, centered on the fact that 
“separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.''33 This narrow focus on state-mandated, 
supposed “de jure” segregation as opposed to any and all forms of substantive segregation 
reinforced the false and extreme perceptual binary of school systems: either they were dual 
systems, with separate facilities for whites and non-whites and therefore segregated, or they 
were not, and therefore were not segregated.  
 
There was widespread denial in the rest of the country (the non-South) of the clear and 
widespread reality of “the government policies which shaped housing and school segregation in 
metropolitan regions throughout the United States”: these were not simply the result of local 
custom or interest group dynamics.34 Specifically and somewhat ironically the New Deal, whose 
virtuous impunity in the eyes of liberal America was never brought into question. This was 
despite the fact that it deliberately and overtly implemented a system of ranking neighbourhoods 
on a grade scale in which racial composition was a crucial factor- sacrificing black Americans’ 
life chances at the altar of homeownership.35  
 
It is also apparent that “significant popular support for meaningful levels of racial integration 
never existed (among whites) throughout the country. Local authorities outside of the South 
“seized on the de facto rationale” to limit their own intervention to the supposed ‘de jure’ and 
frame de facto segregation caused by housing patterns as “beyond their control”- the results of 
the private, personal decisions of American citizens exercising their free will to create an 
‘organic’ situation of racial ghettoisation, as was the case in Washington, D.C.36 The strength of 
 
31 Ibid. 
32 Derrick A. Bell, ‘Dissenting’, in What Brown vs. Board of Education Should Have Said, Edited by Jack 
M. Balkin, (New York: New York University Press, 2001), pp. 185-200. 
33 “Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)”, Justia, 
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/347/483/> [accessed 05/04/2019] 
34  Lassiter, ‘De Facto/ De Jure’, p. 30. 
35 Craig Steven Wilder, A Covenant With Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn, 1636-1990, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 182. 
36 Lassiter, ‘De Facto/ De Jure’, p. 30. 
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this narrative and perverse incentives it created was such that, as Davison M Douglas has 
highlighted, many school officials after 1954 in the North outright denied that there had ever 
been legally mandated school segregation in their jurisdictions.37 Housing segregation was most 
extreme in the northern metropolitan centers, whose racial populations were shifting significantly 
as an influx of black residents due to the Second Great Migration led to an exodus of the city’s 
white population, commonly termed “white flight”, of which this piece argues Washington D.C. 
was functionally a part.38 This combination of white opposition towards active integration and 
entrenched housing segregation allowed segregation to effectively continue. 
 
The response to the Brown decision itself in northern communities generally was one of 
detachment. Some school districts in the North were officially segregated and operated 
separate schools for the races right up until the early 1950s, but though the majority of northern 
communities had maintained officially-segregated systems in the first half of the twentieth 
century as a direct and racist reaction to the Great Migration of black citizens to these northern 
communities, most had made overt administrative assignment of children to separate schools 
according to race illegal before the Brown decisions. By 1949 all of the northern states had 
outlawed explicit segregated schooling, which made the technicalities of the Brown decisions 
largely redundant there and required little to no change of school boards in their administration 
of school systems.39 Continued school segregation in the North despite these legal changes is 
of particular utility in framing the D.C. situation as a broadly similar pattern emerged there. 
Though the legal change in the capital happened later (1954) than generally in the North and 
through Supreme Court decision in Bolling rather than state or local legislation, the resulting 
changes in the administration of the school systems were remarkably similar: authorities tasked 
with making the changes and the communities involved made little outright attempt to defy the 
law or significantly obfuscate and delay its implementation. Rather, they implemented the 
changes the law required and officially desegregated, merging the administration of the two 
school systems rapidly while actually doing very little to actively integrate through combating the 
entrenched results of previous school segregation or countering the housing segregation which 
fed the continued reality of racially separate schools. The housing situation, and therefore the 
school situation, was particularly stark in the northern cities as in Washington, D.C. as racial 
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demographics shifted there to the greatest extent.40 Therefore, the best units of comparative 
analysis for the case of the D.C. school system are of large northern cities which were affected 
demographically to similar extents by black migration and the so-called “white flight” response to 
it, and whose school systems were hence most similar in character and in the circumstances 
and challenges they had to contend with.41 These were cities whose black populations were 
increasing significantly, both numerically and in terms of the percentage of the overall 
population, while the white population was decreasing by both measures, as was the case in 
D.C. in terms of its positioning within the dynamics of the Second Great Migration, along with 
the liberalising pull of being the seat of federal government and its location being “not (in) the 
Deep South” in the nation’s imagined binary of race relations, meant that D.C. acted similarly to 
northern cities in its attitudes and policies around school desegregation.42 
 
The responses of “border” states to Brown were varied. Virginia, to the immediate South of D.C. 
led the South’s “Massive Resistance” to school desegregation, with one county there even 
going as far as shutting down its public school system entirely rather than integrate.43 Brett 
Gadsden has shown how Delaware officials were very sensitive to the politics of locality there 
due to a genuine mix of urban, industrial North and farm-based, conservative South. Though, as 
in D.C., the state Board of Education pledged to “carry out the Court’s mandate”, in Delaware 
they refused to elucidate any timescales and left plans entirely to local school boards. The 
Delaware State Board also accepted that certain areas of the state would need significant time 
to make changes, simply requiring local authorities to submit desegregation plans by that 
October- not to have integrated by then. The closest parallel to D.C. in Delaware was 
Wilmington, the state’s largest city, where a meeting of the Board was held a month after the 
initial Brown decision in 1954 and though it did not agree to any sweeping changes, it began 
processes of desegregation, and made sufficient steps by July of that year to have adopted a 
“freedom of choice”, and “open enrollment” desegregation plan to be implemented that 
September, which was strikingly similar to the course of events in D.C. that same Summer.44 
 
40 Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great Migration, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2011) ; Author unknown, ‘The Great Migration, 1910 to 1970’, United States Census 
Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/dataviz/visualizations/020/>, [accessed on 29/06/2019]. 
41 Frank Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, ‘Demographic Trends in the 20th Century’, United States Census 
Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf>, [accessed 08/05/2019] , p. 33 
42 G. Calvin Mackenzie and Robert Weisbrot, The Liberal Hour: Washington and the Politics of Change in 
the 1960s, (New York: Penguin Press, 1980). 
43 Jill O. Titus, Brown’s Battleground: Students, Segregationists, and the Struggle for Justice in Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).  
44 Gadsden, Between North and South, pp. 101-105. 
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In Maryland, a similar hands-off statewide approach was taken, whereby different counties 
adopted different policies. Though there was no statewide attempt to defy the initial Brown 
decision of May 1954, the counties in the state adopted a “wait and see” attitude, holding off on 
any action until the 1955 Brown II decision on implementation.45 However, Baltimore- the state’s 
largest city and with significant measure of administrative autonomy- did take a similar approach 
to D.C. in its immediate response to Brown. Some teacher transfers were made immediately, 
and by September 1955 there were 4,000 black students attending formerly all-white schools- a 
similar number to the 3,000 initial pupil transfers in the first year of D.C.’s desegregation plan.46 
Thus. D.C. broadly shared little in common with “border” states in these aspects, beyond the 
fact that- as with almost all areas of the Upper South cede Virginia, authorities “accepted the 
validity of the Supreme Court decree” but “aimed to evade its consequences” by launching 
weak, superficial desegregation plans.47  
 
New York, Los Angeles and Chicago provide the most informative northern parallels with D.C. 
All experienced considerable overall population increases in the period 1940 to 1960. Crucially, 
all these cities experienced significant shifts in their demographic makeup, as the white 
proportion of their populations decreased significantly despite often increasing numerically 
simply because the black population increases were so significant. Though D.C. was affected 
by these shifts to the greatest extent, lurching from more than two-thirds white in 1940 to 
becoming the first majority-black city in America by 1960, these cities offer the closest 
similarities. Part of the reason for D.C.’s apparently huge shifts also lies in the specifics of its 
delineation: in the context of the Great Migration, black citizens shifted not just from the rural 
South to the urban North, but white citizens did so reflexively too, from city to suburb as the 
proportion of the population in metropolitan areas living in the city proper reduced from 62.6% to 
51.3%.48 These cities were becoming more black, and less white.  
 
Officials in these cities clung in the years after 1954 to philosophies of “neighbourhood 
schooling”, which dictated that children attend the school closest to them so as to disrupt neither 
 
45 G. James Fleming, ‘Racial Integration in Education in Maryland’, Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 25, 
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46 Ibid, pp. 274-275. 
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 78-80.  
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the child’s life nor the natural and desirable cohesion of local communities.49 As David J. Armor 
has pointed out, the rubric of “neighbourhood schools” was one which has been historically 
employed almost everywhere in the United States “with the exception of the former dual school 
systems of the South”, who had no need for its pretence.50 While an entirely reasonable 
principle in theory, rooted in American national mythology of the small town as ideal and the 
closeness of local communities, in the practical context of heavily ghettoised cities and therefore 
largely monoracial neighbourhoods, this had the effect of schools continuing to be segregated 
by race.51 As sociologist Henri Lefebre has pointed out in his theory of the social production of 
space, space in urban environments is “sociologically produced, or that it is politically 
constructed, but that it assumes the appearance of a “naturally occurring arrangement” of 
society.52 Attitudes which framed the “neighbourhood school” as the organic status quo (and 
thereby, school segregation as “de facto”) and measures to alter that status quo to ensure parity 
for non-white children in ways such as “forced busing” as inorganic are symptomatic of this 
understanding of place, and informed the motives and actions of public officials in the northern 
cities and in D.C. These terms became racialised codes which facilitated outright opposition to 
methods of integration, by framing those methods as artificial interventions: overreach by 
authorities into the ostensibly free choices of Americans. 
 
One prominent example is New York City. Such was the power of this ideal of neighbourhood 
schooling that, the authorities in one of the most liberal locales in America “refused to consider 
any steps” in the decade after Brown that “subverted the educational philosophy of 
neighbourhood schools”, as Board members openly stated that they viewed housing 
segregation as the natural result of the idea that humans were inclined to “live with one’s own”.53  
Even relatively “modest” proposals in the largest city in the nation, with only limited 
reassignment of teachers and some redrawn attendance zones with optional transfers of 
students, were defeated by local opposition arguing under the neighbourhood principle.Such 
was this level of denial mixed with detachment among the school authorities that the 
Superintendent of Schools, William Jansen, instructed his staff not to use the term “segregated” 
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to describe the state of the city’s schools, urging them to use less emotive terms such as 
“racially imbalanced”, in order to quell any sense of outrage or urgency, and shift the situation 
from one actively maintained to one passively tolerated.54  Special committees were set up by 
the authorities not with mandates to solve problems, but rather to decide whether problems 
existed at all. This resulted in a situation in which, as no active measures whatsoever had been 
taken to integrate the school system, non-white children continued to attend worse schools and 
receive worse educations in New York City after 1954. As Adina Black has highlighted, the 
racial inequality in New York City’s public schools was a clear issue that took up a “heightened 
urgency” in the 1950s as black parent activists’ vigorous organised dissent throughout this 
period shows.55 Around a third of the city’s non-white children attended heavily non-white 
schools (categorised as >85% non-white students), with many more obviously attending schools 
segregated to a lesser extent. Though the per-pupil spend in these heavily black and hispanic 
schools was roughly similar to the majority white schools, the buildings were much older: the 
average majority-white Junior High in New York City was 15 years old while the average 
majority-minority Junior High was 35 years old. These schools with large majority non-white 
populations also had on average fewer permanent teachers, with resulting racial gaps in pupil to 
teacher ratios plugged by supply teachers.56 Such was the clear lack of school integration in 
New York City that in 1964, fully ten years post-Brown, a one-day boycott in protest of this fact 
was held by 300,000 black and Hispanic students there.57 These realities thoroughly support 
Jeanne Theoharis’ conclusion that like so many other northern cities, “New York City never 
comprehensively desegregated its schools”.58 
 
Of further relevance to the process of school desegregation in Washington, D.C. are the paths 
of those same processes in Los Angeles. The black population in Los Angeles also roughly 
trebled, and was 13.5% of the city’s population by 1960 and complemented by significant 
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hispanic influx as well.59 Proportionately, though not numerically, these increases were even 
larger than that in D.C., where more than 200,000 migrants had doubled the black population in 
these two decades. Jeanne Theoharis has shown that school officials in Los Angeles utilised 
the fact that their city’s school segregation did not precisely mirror that of the Deep South to 
refute segregation’s very existence, shifting the burden of proving that the schools were in fact 
segregated onto civil rights activists and avoiding wholesale structural change through 
passivity.60   
 
Similar administrative manoeuvres were made in Los Angeles as would later be made in D.C., 
such as the utilisation of “attendance boundaries, feeder patterns, transportation policies (and) 
teacher hiring practices” to ensure the retention of the segregated status quo.61 In a particular 
similarity to Washington, D.C., this continued school segregation would later be ruled by federal 
courts to be deliberate and illegal, at least partly due to their policies of tracking non-white pupils 
into manual or vocational programs as opposed to college preparatory ones.62 In a 1967 legal 
case, Hobson v. Hansen, the D.C. school track system-introduced just one year after the Brown 
decisions and the implementation of the Superintendent’s integration plan-  was ruled to have 
done the same. Both track systems can be considered what Reva Siegel has termed 
“preservation (of segregation) through transformation”, and Anders Walker has expounded to be 
part of the non-defiant backlash to Brown’s mandates, “transforming the legal criteria for 
segregating students from overt racial classifications to facially neutral, standards-based 
criteria”. 63 
 
Data on disparities in Los Angeles presented by Josh Sides show pattern of housing 
segregation there throughout the 1940s and ‘50s led by white homeowners and “buttressed by 
the policies” of local, state, and federal institutions, as what had previously been multiracial 
neighbourhoods became monoracial.64 However, even during these earlier times of relatively-
integrated housing, schooling had remained segregated by the authorities, through the drawing 
of irregularly-shaped blatantly-gerrymandered attendance zones, and in drawing the most 
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monoracial borders possible between these attendance zones, even where simple slight 
adjustments could have been drawn to integrate the schools in many areas.65 An increase in 
segregation in housing post- World War II in Los Angeles mirrored that in D.C., and meant  
“school segregation worsened in Los Angeles after the Brown decision”, as these racial 
gerrymanders and racist school assignment practices became easier to justify and obfuscate 
with the rhetoric of  “color-blindness” and neighbourhood schools. In fact, school officials 
continually redrew school assignment boundaries as just one of many “systematic methods” of 
maintaining segregated schools in LA during the 1950s and 60s.66 
 
A “culturalist” discourse further emerged in these cities, whereby black underachievement was 
attributed to cultural deprivation rather than inferior, segregated education.67 This was despite 
the fact that the roots of black underachievement were clear for anyone who bothered to look. 
As the 1965 report “The Negro Family: The Case For National Action” by then- Assistant 
Secretary of Labor Daniel Moynihan made abundantly clear,  the deprivational aspects of the 
black ghettos were not individual or interpersonal but structural, and a clear trajectory could be 
traced from the injustices of slavery and Reconstruction right through to the contemporary 
issues in black ghettos.68  
 
The idea that black communities were collectively and culturally responsible for their own 
children’s educational shortcomings was something which legitimised white opposition to 
integration as one of purely educational concerns over their children’s progress being hampered 
by slower classmates rather than a social one of simply not wanting their children to mix with 
black children. Equally, this focus on the power of the individual student and their immediate 
family and community units to improve their education led the conversation away from broader 
questions of racial and structural inequality and the inevitability of black underachievement in 
the context of underfunded black education.69 This rhetoric would also be used in Washington, 
D.C. after Bolling to the same ends. Ultimately, these justifications fed directly into the “freedom 
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of choice” plans implemented in these cities, which ostensibly provided its citizens with the 
ultimate colourblind American value of personal choice, but financial provisions to support those 
wishing to transfer were consistently and deliberately absent from such programs.70 The 
obvious result was that wealthier white students could afford to self-select, and essentially opt 
out of integration by transferring to further-away white schools while their generally poorer black 
peers, unable to afford transport and without any public provision of funds for busing, were 
restricted to their local ghetto school.71 By the early-1970s, the worsening results of these 
policies were stark and obvious, as 87% of black students in Los Angeles attended schools 
which were at least 80% non-white, and 8% attended schools which were 100% non-white.72  
 
Perhaps the most relevant case study to that of the school segregation in Washington, D.C. is 
that of Chicago. Though no major city matched D.C.’s rapid and dramatic increase in black 
population as it became the nation’s first majority-black major city by the end of the 1950s, 
Chicago perhaps comes closest. Between 1940 and 1960, both cities experienced significant 
growth in their already-substantial black populations as Chicago’s black population almost 
trebled from 277,731 (8.2% of the total population) to 812,637 (22.9% of the total population), 
while in D.C. the black contingent of the population increased from 187,266 (28.2% of the total 
population) to 411,737 (53.9% of the total population”. Both cities also experienced significant 
decreases in their white populations over this period, as around 400,000 whites left Chicago (c. 
13% on the 1940 total white population), and almost 130,000 whites left the District of Columbia 
(c. 27% decrease on the 1940 total white population).73  
 
Similarities in the attitudes to school desegregation and official policy approaches to integrating 
the public school systems in these two cities reflect these similarities in racial demographic 
shifts. Particularly remarkable were the similarities in tenure and outlook of the respective 
School Superintendents: Benjamin Coppage Willis who arrived in Chicago to lead the public 
schools in 1953, Hobart Corning, who was in charge of the D.C. schools before, during, and 
immediately after “desegregation”, and Carl Hansen who became Superintendent of the D.C. 
school system in 1958 having previously held positions as Associate and then Assistant 
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Superintendent there since 1947 under his predecessor as Superintendent, Hobart Corning.74 
Hansen introduced a four-track system into the D.C. system which separated students 
ostensibly according to academic ability as measured by test scores and at the time was seen 
as at the vanguard of the future of education.75 Willis improved various aspects of the Chicago 
schools during his tenure, including swathes of construction to improve physical school facilities 
totalling over $250million, decreased average class sizes, and increased average teachers’ 
salaries. 76 
 
Like many other school officials in the northern cities, Corning and Hansen were wedded to the 
ideal of neighbourhood schooling, and Willis similarly resisted any attempts to make schools 
arenas or laboratories for social change, and because Brown had in Chicago as across the 
nation “implied more than it immediately resolved”, it was left for local officials such as these to 
interpret through their own socially-constructed biases.77 Just as Willis, when pressed, insisted 
that he was unaware of the racial demographics of his school system as it was irrelevant to his 
“colorblind” approach, Hansen- along with his Board of Education- made a request to the D.C. 
commissioners in 1960 to end the practice of monitoring the racial composition of the school 
system which had been required by an Act of Congress since 1925, arguing that it “no longer 
served a useful purpose”.78 These “colorblind” approaches, as elsewhere in the nation, refused 
to take any responsibility for real, active integration in the schools. Both resigned in the mid 
1960s as a result of backlash to their “colorblind” policies which had essentially been deemed 
little short of continued segregation. Hansen resigned in 1967 after the Board of Education 
refused to allow him to appeal a legal decision which deemed his track system to be 
segregatory, and Willis agreed to retire in 1966 following large-scale protests in which 
classrooms were boycotted and his own home was picketed. 79 
  
As early as 1957, Willis had been made aware of the plight of his system’s black students who 
attended schools with an average enrollment of 1,200 students while their white peers attended 
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schools averaging 700. By 1962, as Willis remained committed to “neighbourhood schools”, the 
problem was even worse, as 80% of the city’s black children attended virtually all-black schools 
and of the 20,000 pupils on double-shifts due to overcrowding, well over three-quarters were 
black. In 1958, the school board reaffirmed its neighbourhood policy and tightened the 
requirements for transfers.80 The ever-dogmatic Willis consistently continued to refuse to 
countenance any proposals to transfer students from overcrowded black schools to empty white 
classrooms elsewhere in the city on any large scale. The few small-scale, narrow transfer 
programs initiated were ineffective due to their over-specificity, as a policy of allowing children 
from schools with over 40 pupils per classroom to attend those with fewer than 30 pupils per 
classroom affected the transfers of only two hundred children.81 
 
Dionne Danns has exhaustively made clear the fact that institutional racism in the Chicago 
Public Schools and the intransigent opposition of Supt. Willis to anything which might disrupt the 
‘natural’ order of neighbourhood schooling caused the local approach to school desegregation 
“to stall”, in spite of the work of committed local activists, including the compilation of forensically 
detailed reports which laid bare the stark inequality between black and white schooling after the 
Brown decisions. As such, any progress which was made (mostly after the mid-1960s) was due 
to the federal influence of the 1964 Civil Rights Act rather than any progressively-inclined 
municipal authorities.82 True integration necessitated the political. The Constitution, as 
fundamentally interpreted in the Brown cases, does not dictate that school populations be 
“demographically identical”, simply that they not be “intentionally segregated on the basis of 
race”, a truly integrationist policy required political action rather than just the superficial 
desegregation required by a close reading of the law.83 Ultimately, in Chicago, as in D.C. and 
the other cities discussed here, local authorities adhered to only this bare minimum legal 
standard, andallowed the public school systems to effectively remain segregated in the decade 
after Brown.  
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III: Structures of Governance Erected, Structures of Schoolhouses Neglected: 
The Origins and Impacts Washington D.C.’s Peculiar Public School Management 
 
The D.C. Public School system was chronically underfunded throughout the entire period being 
analysed here. This was the direct result of the complex system of several different bodies at 
different levels- the federal and municipal- with different inputs, incentives, and political 
feedback loops, being variously and separately responsible for the administration, regulation, 
and financing of the D.C. school system. This created inherent incongruity and conflicting 
incentives. At the same time, structural changes to the administration of the schools, particularly 
to the Board of Education at the start of the twentieth century, cemented white supremacy as 
the unimpeachable, ostensibly apolitical status quo. Historians such as Steven J. Diner have 
written about the unique limiting structures surrounding education in the District in the twentieth 
Century, particularly relating to school finance, and this piece seeks to explore how the 
administrators of the system operated within the confines these structures. 
 
The Public School System in Washington is one of the oldest in the United States- much older 
even than the D.C government.84 The first public schools were formed in the then-separate 
cities of Washington and Georgetown in 1805 and 1810 respectively, barely a generation after 
the founding of the United States itself.85 Though these schools were only free of charge for the 
very poorest and offered only a narrow two-year period of schooling in reading, writing, and 
arithmetic, as well as being funded by specific taxes levied on certain less desirable businesses 
and activities rather than general taxation, they can be reasonably characterised as a part of the 
proto-Common School Movement which was emerging in the Northeastern United States in the 
early nineteenth century. This was a nascent campaign particularly in the rapidly-growing urban 
North in this period with the aim of combining the patchwork of “free schools”, often funded by 
charity or religious philanthropy, into more class-inclusive systems of “common schools” funded 
by tax revenues.86 Black children could not attend these early D.C. schools, nor indeed could 
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many at all: by 1840 only 989 of the capital’s 4,401 school-aged children attended school, and 
of these only 213 attended the public schools.87 
 
This system remained largely unchanged until circumbellum winds of social and political change 
blew it towards progress in the second half of the nineteenth century.  In 1845, as the Common 
School Movement snowballed, a reorganisation of the school system was undertaken, led by 
prominent members of local elite white society, including then-Mayor William Seaton.88 These 
were again shaped by northern influences, as the “New England plan” of increasing school 
funds through property taxes in order to fund universal schooling (for white children) was 
adopted, though even by 1857 only slightly more than half of children attended school, and of 
these, more attended private than public facilities. Piecemeal congressional appropriations were 
made to Washington’s public schools in the 1850s, and by 1878, half of the funding for District 
government, and therefore the schools, began to be appropriated directly from Congress, 
including money to build the District’s first High School, Central High, in 1881.89 The new 
generation of educators in these schools came primarily from the Northeast- Boston, New 
Jersey and elsewhere.90  
 
In 1864, in the midst of the recent outlawing of slavery in the capital district and the ongoing 
Civil War over slavery, a parallel “colored” public school system was established by Congress.91 
Initially under the direct control of the U.S. Department of Interior, the consolidation of District 
municipal government in the early 1870s led to the existing board of trustees of the white 
schools taking responsibility for the black schools as well. A “common board of education 
composed of white and coloured membership” was formed, which initially retained the black 
schools’ superintendent alongside the white Superintendent. The dual-school system, with 
separate schools for whites and non-whites, under a single administrative hierarchy was firmly 
entrenched as the number of pupils in the public schools- particularly the High Schools and 
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kindergartens- proliferated rapidly into the twentieth century and transformed the D.C. public 
schools into a large-scale urban school system.92 
 
By 1906, these regularly-reconstituted structures had crystallised into the ones which would 
shape the nature of the administration of the public schools- both black and white. The Organic 
Law of that year set out the complex cogs of the District’s school governance, and the various 
dimensions through which these cogs would machinate. These structures which governed the 
public schools of the District for the following two-thirds of a century or so can be broadly 
separated into administrative and financial aspects, into neither of which the citizens of the 
District had any input. These systems were inert and unresponsive: overlapping and abutting 
where they should not have been, and discordant where communication and cooperation were 
essential for the proper running of the schools. The rigidity of these separate structures and 
their lack of symbiosis led to an underfunded, failing public school system throughout this 
period.  
 
The administrative battlelines were set in 1906. The structure of the Board of Education, which 
would oversee the system at its monthly meetings was crystallised: nine members, three of 
which were mandated to be three women.93 Additionally, three members were to be “colored” 
but  rather than by statute, this provision was merely tradition. The previous act creating the 
Board of Trustees for the schools in 1882 had established this as a legal requirement, and 
though this requirement was technically overturned by the 1906 law, the practice of appointing 
three black members was retained.94 This Board in turn appointed a Superintendent of Schools 
who was to be an educational expert, in charge of the day-to-day administration of the system 
as well as being its lead pedagogical policymaker.95  
 
Crucially, the process of appointing the Board changed. In an attempt to “depoliticise” the Board 
of Education, the 1906 restructuring shifted the responsibility of appointing the Board members 
from the District Commissioners to federal judges of the District of Columbia Circuit Courts.96 
While this made little difference in terms of their mandate- the Board was still appointed 
indirectly by the President of the United States as both federal judges and the District 
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Commissioners were direct presidential appointees- it did attempt to move the Board above the 
political fray. This was of course fantastical, as any school board’s role in the distribution and 
management of educational resources is fundamentally political as they attempt to balance the 
interests of different groups: making value judgements on the best uses for resources, and 
particularly so in D.C. where the resources were limited by the structural issues around school 
funding. The legacy of this veneer of apoliticalness was one one which, while the Board in its 
role had to continue to make what were clearly political decisions and upheld the racial status 
quo on the schools, it could present the optics of the situation as simply following the law. It 
could uphold white supremacy while dispensing of all responsibility for doing so. 
 
An early example of this “depoliticised” nature of the Board was in the assignment of a young 
mixed-race girl, Isabel Wall, to a school in 1910. In response to a Court decision which had 
ruled that the assignment of pupils whose race was uncertain or contested was entirely at the 
discretion of the Board of Education, a special Board meeting was called in order to adjudicate 
as to which of the Divisions the child should be taught in. Wall had initially been accepted by a 
white school in her neighbourhood as she appeared to be white. As the court case teased out, 
she was either one-eighth or one-sixteenth black, and the trial judge himself stated there was 
“no physical characteristic of the child which afforded ocular evidence of aught but the 
caucasian”.97 However, once the principal found out about the child’s mixed ancestry, she was 
excluded from the school. The judge ruled that the school was within its rights to do so, that it 
was not unreasonable to describe the child as “colored” in “the common meaning” of the term, 
and that it was the responsibility of the Board of Education to make such racial distinctions in 
liminal cases as the laws governing the D.C. schools contained no explicit definition of the terms 
“white” or colored”.98 Indeed, this ostensibly allowed those officials making such distinctions of 
race relative freedom in their pronouncements, rather than the rigid definitions of race the white 
members of the Board indicated they were bound by in the Wall case.  
 
 At the Board of Education’s meeting in May 1910, it attempted to resolve Wall’s situation, with 
the child and her family present and observing. Several members of the Board made their own 
pontificating enquiries as to what defined a “colored” child, with one stating that the child 
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appeared white.99 One white member made the suggestion that a proper process and standard 
should be established for determining such questions, but in a move telling of the Board’s 
reluctance to make more general pronouncements on such value judgements than were 
absolutely necessary for preserving the status quo (and could be used to hold them to account 
in future cases), this idea gained no traction.100 The Board acknowledged the presence of the 
Wall family, and then at 5pm took a recess, to return a full four hours later at 9pm to continue 
deliberations. Such a lengthy delay was not usual Board practice, and in and of itself appears 
deliberately engineered such that the Wall parents and their young child- or any similarly 
stakeholding families- would not be able to attend. The 9pm resumption of the meeting was 
even more bizarre and telling of the Board’s desire to avoid public controversy or political 
disagreement: a half-hour debate about whether or not further witnesses to the matter should be 
placed under oath was resolved after a ten-minute recess which clearly involved behind-closed-
doors compromise among Board members, as the Board had apparently decided unanimously 
and in a complete volte-face that “no other testimony is necessary”.101 
 
 In fact, the only public disagreement amongst Board members at this meeting was procedural, 
over whether new testimony which had not been presented in the legal case should be heard at 
all. When one member suggested adopting a visual standard for determining a child’s race as 
opposed to a so-called “one-drop-of-blood rule”, the Board adjourned for discussion totalling a 
further two hours. Shortly before midnight, following these lengthy discussions out of the public 
view and off the public record, it was clear that the Board was unable or more likely unwilling to 
agree on such a standard- they returned with the simple, narrow motion that “Isabel Wall, for the 
purposes of school classification, is a colored child”.102 This motion was passed by eight votes 
to one, with the sole objector- the first black woman Board of Education member in the country 
Mary Church Terrell - doing so on the grounds that she disagreed with the verdict, as the child 
“appeared white” to her.103 This dissent by Mrs. Terrell is important in highlighting that some 
measure of dissent did happen amongst the Board regarding issues of race, but such open 
dissent was often limited to only one or two members as indeed Mrs Terrell herself stated that 
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“several times she stood alone” in opposing such matters, as discord was hidden as much as 
possible behind procedural closed doors by the Chairmen of the Board.104   
 
The Board was not monolithic, and any depiction of it as such would be crude and injudicious. 
However, the Board did, through its dominant majority, act within the structural confines of the 
1906 law to try and appear apolitical while furthering the interests of whites.  
 
It is important here to place the lack of open support for Mrs. Terrell’s vigorous dissent in this 
instance from the other two black members of the Board into historical context, as well as the 
unwavering support for the segregated system by the Assistant Superintendent for the black 
schools, Garnett Wilkinson, throughout his fifty-year career. This incident occurred during a 
period of rigorous debate in black intellectual circles about how best to “uplift the race” within a 
racist, segregated society. While Mrs. Terrell seems to have taken a similarly fiery, direct, and 
radical approach towards confronting white supremacy and eschewing cooperation with 
oppressive systems in the mold of W.E.B. Dubois as expressed in his 1903 work The Souls of 
Black Folk. By contrast, the other members of the Board and Mr. Wilkinson appear to have 
taken a more “accommodationist” approach and working constructively within the system to 
improve it, as advocated by Du Bois’ intellectual rival Booker T. Washington.105 These other 
black members were reluctant to send the young Ms. Wall to a white school as to do so would 
have been to admit “that there is degradation or humiliation attached to attending a white 
school”, and undermine black education conceptually.106 Similarly, Garnet Wilkinson’s view was 
that separate black schools allowed for the building of black community and intellectual identity, 
and as such focussed his efforts on ensuring ‘equal’ aspect of the ‘separate but equal’ 
doctrine.107  All of this is to say that the lack of open opposition to such decisions does not 
necessarily display a lack of understanding of, or anger at, the disparity between the black and 
white schools, but perhaps rather a different interpretation of how best to approach such 
disparities. 
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The Wall episode of displays in microcosm the white majority of the Board’s utilisation of its 
“apolitical” status to further the established paradigm of white supremacy by making political 
decisions, such as subjectively deciding the race of a small child by choosing to apply the ‘one 
drop of blood rule’ so often used as a method of determining “purity or contamination” by the 
American legal system to uphold racist laws and systems, and framing them as objective.108   
 
The leadership of the Board’s clear attempts to remove potentially impassioned observers from 
the process by shifting the time of the meeting, to keep its disagreements and discussions on 
controversial matters relating to racial policy in private before presenting as united-a-front as 
possible, and avoidance of any answering any broader political questions other than the very 
narrow one in front of them are testament to how its “depoliticised” status ostensibly limited its 
decision-making while facilitating continued white supremacy. A note in nuance is important 
here. None of this is to say that the Board was a united body acting in perfect concert 
throughout this period. In fact, as Steven Diner has pointed out, quite the opposite: the Board 
was extremely factional throughout much of its existence.109 This factionalism and resultant 
disagreement, however, was largely related to issues of the meta-political.  
 
The open disagreements between Board members were almost entirely to do with personal ego 
and power dynamics- a further negative externality of appointing elites to the Board who had 
multitudinous, and often competing, political or economic interests. As Diner highlights further, 
this often manifested itself as “pettifogging”: arguing over minor, unimportant details in attempts 
at one-upsmanship, and the origins of disagreements were almost entirely rooted in the 
dysfunction of the Board as part of the wider systematic dysfunctions and perverse incentives of 
the system. Key examples of this were Board members disagreeing as to the role and level of 
influence of the Superintendent, and the anger which resulted from Board members trying to 
have District Commissioners removed from their roles or advancing their personal business 
interests through Board policy.110  
 
The Board was as dysfunctional in many ways as the wider system of which it was part, in terms 
of process. It was often an arena for personal advancement or political games of power and 
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clashes of ego. Mrs Terrell’s own experiences on the Board support these conclusions; she 
pointed out, for example, that one member’s opinion was “extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to change once it had been formed and forcibly, publicly expressed”.111 Essentially, some 
members were more concerned about potentially losing face politically and personally than they 
were about the merits of the policies themselves. 
 
 As the Wall episode demonstrates, however, these clashes were not seen in substantive policy 
issues relating to race. In matters of race, where the white majority of the Board’s interests 
aligned, there was much less contentiousness, though clearly some dissent from its black 
membership. Indeed, there was little incentive for the white majority on the Board to wade too 
deep into the mire of race policy when it could hide its white-supremacist incentives behind 
screens of “apoliticalness” and rigid adherence to established policy of separate schools. 
 
 This point is further undergirded by the Board’s willingness to make exceptions in similar liminal 
cases as was politically expedient, for example the treatment of students East-Asian heritage, a 
group of children whose racial status -like that of Isabel Wall and indeed race generally- was 
“flexible, inconsistent, and subject to debate and revision”.112 As Antoinette Lee has pointed out, 
the Board and its officials consistently allowed Asian children (who could have fallen into the 
“colored” category of the school system as this was defined in the negative: i.e “colored” 
children were designated so not because of what they were, but what they weren’t: white) to 
attend white schools. Because many of the children of Asian descent were the children of 
powerful diplomatic families in D.C., these children, in their admittedly small numbers, were 
allowed to attend the white schools. This continued even after the Board were explicitly 
permitted to send them to “colored” schools by the Supreme Court in Lum v. Rice (1927), 
though it of course made no such compromises for Isabel Wall when a Court had similarly given 
it free rein to do so.113 The majority of the Board clearly acted politically and made concessions 
to the dual school system when necessary in serving its own political interests, but refused to do 
so and hid behind its “apolitical” status when refusing to consider nuance in the case of mixed-
race black children.  
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One further aspect of the 1906 administrative change was that the black schools lost their 
Superintendent. Division I (white) and Division II (black) schools were merged completely in 
their leadership, and the black schools effectively relegated to junior partner in the theoretical 
administration of the schools as well as in the preexisting financial and physical realities. The 
black schools were to be managed by the Assistant Superintendent for black schools, 
subordinate to the (white) Superintendent. The theoretical benefits to the black schools of this 
tradeoff were precisely and singularly that- theoretical. The 1906 law included a provision that 
black teachers be paid equally to white teachers, and that construction funding for the two 
school divisions be equalised. However, the law and the reality were dissonant. Laws which had 
mandated equal funding for black and white schooling had been on the books in D.C. since the 
early 1870s.114  
 
The District of Columbia was not forced to operate a “separate but equal” system under any 
legal precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) but in fact nominally operated such a policy as 
generated through its own, specific legislation decades earlier. Yet, the reality was still one of 
stark inequalities, and remained so well into the early twentieth century and beyond: between 
1923 and 1937, school per-pupil funding allocations between the Divisions were 
disproportionately favourable to whites despite the presence of such laws.115 Moreover, this is 
part of a pattern of dissonance between the stated policy- usually of racial equity- of District 
education officials and their actions and decisions in reality- usually upholding white supremacy- 
that would further be demonstrated later, in the sizeable gap between the rhetoric and the reality 
of the Board of Education regarding school desegregation.  
 
Even though the Board’s role was clearly political, and it advanced the interests of whites at the 
expense of blacks, the so-called “depoliticisation” was quite effective. In the 1930s, black 
discontentment with unequal spending was generally addressed “not to the Board of Education 
but to the Commissioners, officials at the Bureau of the Budget, and House Subcommittees”, 
though the Board was doing little to balance spending between the two Divisions.116 A further 
assessment, by a white observer in 1945, was that the Board had shown itself to be “free of any 
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evidences of politics, of personal bias, and of self-seeking motives”, despite continued failure to 
address black and white inequality to the benefit of their own majority interest group. 117  
 
The dynamics of the racial-interest groups of the Board were also tied up in overlapping class 
interests. Crucially, the switch in 1906 from a remunerated Board to one which was unpaid 
meant that only those who could afford to give up their time for free, often in the evenings or 
afternoons for bimonthly Board meetings (i.e. likely not working-class parents), could be 
members.118 This economic reality combined with the selection of the Board by members of the 
Washington judicial elite clearly cemented the Board’s membership into one dominated by white 
interests, and upper-middle class interests. This is neatly illustrated by the professions of the 
Chairmen of the Board of Education from 1906 through to 1937, which consists almost entirely 
of military officers, lawyers, and businessmen, peppered with the odd clergyman and 
educator.119 Of the sixty-one Board members from 1906 to 1937, all but nine housewives had 
middle-class white collar jobs. Even these housewives were members of elite families.120 The 
limitations on the ability of working-class blacks (or indeed whites)- those most harshly affected 
by the poor quality of public schools- to become members of the Board were crystallised by 
these structures.  
 
To compound the limitations this new administrative structure placed on black educational 
progress, the attempts to depoliticise the Board of Education also damaged black schools in 
other ways. Previously, the District Commissioners had the authority to overrule the Board of 
Education. In one such instance in 1882, the District Comptroller ruled that the black schools 
were owed $19,000 as the Board had underfunded Division II in several of the previous years. 
The all-white Board (then the Board of Trustees) ruled that the black schools did not need this 
$19,000, despite them being significantly worse-equipped than the white schools. This theft of 
black school funding, was only reversed and reprimanded when the District Commissioners- 
then the final arbiters of D.C. public education- intervened.121 The 1906 law removed the 
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Commissioners’ ability to interfere in such matters, and appointed the Board as the supreme 
administrative organ for D.C. education, as the Commissioners were overtly political appointees 
and the Board was not. Any further injustices to black students in order to benefit white students 
could henceforth only be contested in the court of public opinion- though there was no 
democratic mechanism through which to filter this opinion into actual change- or be disputed 
before the very same Board which had inflicted these injustices by remonstrating at one of the 
Board’s monthly meetings. The members of the Board also could not reasonably be removed 
from office as their appointers were judges without the political capital to do so; in reality 
membership could only be changed through replacing members at the end of their staggered 
three-year terms.  
 
Further, the development of an unwritten but continuing tradition of the selection of three black 
Board of Education members was at the time of the law’s promulgation a reasonable stab at 
ensuring roughly proportionate black representation on the Board.122 However, as the 
population demographics shifted- and D.C.’s black population began to outnumber the white 
population at mid-century, this one-third black Board membership criteria remained. What had 
at its inception been a progressive move which ensured black voices be heard at the volume of 
their population became, due to the rigidity of the system, essentially an upper limit on black 
Board membership which held it well below a representative number of Board members. The 
Board effectively remained majority-white by tradition, and therefore likely to prioritise white 
interests as previously all-white Boards had done.  
 
Separately from the administration and oversight of the schools, the labyrinthian corridors 
through which the financial aspects of the District schools were run and, in particular, the 
circuitousness of its budgeting process- contributed to chronic structural deficiencies in the 
school system by essentially guaranteeing underfunding in two key ways: its total budgetary 
amounts being inevitably bargained down through multiple stages of negotiation; and political 
changeability making long-term improvement projects impossible. 
 
 
122 In the year 1900, the most recent census data available at that time, 86,702 of the District’s 191,532 
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The D.C. school budget had to “traverse a uniquely long and sinuous path “from planning to 
funding to spending.123 By 1928, the law had made the D.C. school budgeting process so 
complex and “so intricate that only the District Auditor understood them.''124 The process began 
with the Board of Education, which invited interested parties to contribute. The budget was then 
filtered through the scrutinising eyes of the District Commissioners, the Bureau of the Budget, 
and submitted to Congress by the President as part of the federal budget to be further 
dismembered by various congressional committees and subcommittees. Every individual 
expense had to be justified elaborately- an administrative absurdity in a system which by 1945 
was responsible for 90,000 students and 4,000 staff in 178 buildings.125  This process naturally 
led to budgetary erosion, and the initial funding proposed by the Board as necessary for its 
functions was invariably cut, though admittedly to varying extents: some budgets were generous 
enough to be almost bare bones while others were simply woefully inadequate.  
 
This was perhaps best demonstrated in the budget following the 1949 Strayer Report, which 
had submitted to Congress a damning assessment of the situation of the school situation in 
D.C. and set out minimum funding needs. These funding needs were assessed at three 
graduated levels: “minimum-efficiency” would require $28.325million, “acceptable” required 
$28.970million, and “defensible” required $29.655million. The budget requested by the 
Commissioners and allocated by Congress was $23.323million- not only significantly below the 
minimum-required level, but also $1.7million below the previous year’s allocation in a city rapidly 
expanding.126 The results of this budgetary erosion were felt hardest by black students. As a 
letter from the local NAACP pointed out that in 1947 the budgetary shortcomings meant that, 
among other things “at all levels the schools attended by Negroes are understaffed'': the burden 
of double-sessions was being felt almost entirely by black students. At High school level 
specifically, “Negro children receive sub-standard vocational and educational guidance services 
due to the fact that persons appointed as counsellors must undertake classroom work”.127  
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This budgetary erosion also affected the construction of new buildings- usually allocated 
separately from the main budget. As well as being underfunded- in 1947, for example, the 
Board requested $10million for construction which was watered down by the end of the process 
to $3.2 million. The buildings were therefore underfunded but this underfunding also interacted 
with the inflexibility and difficulties in long-term planning of the system to make the facilities 
situation even more perilous. 
 
Perhaps, therefore, the best way to examine the effect of these financial structures on the ability 
to maintain- let alone improve- the school system in the medium- to long-term at the time is to 
examine the physical structures of the school buildings themselves. The physical infrastructure 
of the school system required significant, consistent capital outlays separate from the annual 
school budget, which was to cover annual operating costs rather than capital investment. It was 
this basic, yet fundamental infrastructure which suffered most from an inability to plan more than 
a year in advance, as congressional appropriations were only certain once finalised in any given 
year’s federal budget, regardless of any previous promises or allocations. A five-year school-
building plan proposed in 1925, for example, was cut drastically short before its full allocation of 
$20million had been distributed as the Congress cut funding in the late 1920s as part of wider 
budgetary trimming due to the Great Depression. Those schools which were built or improved 
through this program did little more than replace existing schools unfit for purpose: the school 
infrastructure was treading water rather than making strides. Even securing funding for basics 
such as electric lighting and modern heating systems was an arduous administrative ordeal.128 
In 1939, an act providing $8million for new schoolhouses which ostensibly improved the 
situation actually similarly replaced old buildings, rather than building new ones for a school 
system whose enrollment had shot up by 25% in the previous decade.129 Horace Mann 
Elementary, for example, was a white school constructed in 1931 to replace frame-built school 
structures from the Civil War almost seventy years previous.130 
 
Further, as with the annual school budget, capital expenditures had to be justified and itemised 
in advance- multi-year school building programs required the use of existing trends and 
demographics to predict the future need for school facilities. This budgetary rigidity in a city as 
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demographically fluid as D.C. was a recipe for inaccurate predictions and misallocated 
resources in such long-term plans, with the predictable effect of weakening the case for any 
similar future investment, in a vicious cycle of limiting investment in the D.C. schools.  
 
An analysis of the school construction programmes in the fifteen years preceding the Second 
World War demonstrates the severity of this situation. Many of the schools being built were 
intended to relieve overcrowding elsewhere, but by the time they had been constructed were 
themselves overcrowded due to population shifts in the lengthy intervening time periods 
between proposal and construction. Lafayette Elementary, a white school, opened its doors in 
1931 to 400 pupils in a brand-new building designed to hold 320. Similarly, twelve years later, 
the (white) Kramer Junior High opened in 1943 with an initial enrollment of 1,240- almost a full 
25% above its planned maximum capacity of 1,000 pupils.131  This was an ongoing, ever-
morphing problem to which D.C.’s clunky, bloated system could not respond nearly quick 
enough, even if it had been inclined to do so. 
 
It is important to emphasise the racist nature of these school constructions and improvements 
as well. While many of the white schools were overcrowded and not enough was being done for 
them, the black schools were significantly more neglected, as was the case throughout the 
history of the D.C. Schools. From 1930 to 1945, four major construction efforts were undertaken 
to improve District’s Senior High Schools. Every one of these projects was to improve the white 
Senior Highs; a total of $4.35million dollars was spent on new facilities for white Senior High 
students while their black peers received not a single penny in such funding, as white needs 
were prioritised by public financiers at these times of fiscal difficulty.132 Local activists, such as 
the D.C. branch of the NAACP had been objecting to the unfair balance of these building 
shortcomings as early as 1922, as the various levels of the budgetary process had shifted the 
balance of construction funds allocated that year from an initial 70-30 white-black split to a 90-
10 split  far disproportionate to the population.133 The imperviousness of the budgetary process 
meant that little could be changed over the long-term, and such piecemeal battles were all 
which could be fought.  
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D.C. residents were completely powerless because they were cut out of the political feedback 
loops which could force any real change. They were not able to influence the makeup of the 
Congress which controlled their finances, nor their local educational officials even infinitesimally 
until the Twenty-third Amendment was adopted in 1961 which allowed them to vote for the 
President who appointed the judges who appointed the Board of Education who appointed the 
Superintendent who appointed their children’s teachers. One exasperated resident summed the 
situation up neatly in 1935, stating that “we have as much control (over school governance)... as 
we do over the cost of igloos in Iceland”.134 The inefficiencies of this system were clear: between 
1934 and 1940, Congress undertook thirty separate investigations into D.C.’s municipal 
problems, to little avail.135 This caused a situation in which rather than how to address its actual 
on-the-ground problems, much of the District’s local political bandwith was taken up with 
questions of how to deal with the ineffective structures and democratic deficits which were 
exacerbating them. 
 
Not only were the financial, legislative, and administrative frameworks of managing public 
education in D.C. each individually lumbering and ineffective, but the fact that they were so 
uniquely separate exacerbated this. Where in other major American cities, school systems were 
run by a Board of Education which had “full authority over school taxes, administering school 
funds, and practically independent control of the schools”, these functions were distributed 
throughout the political system in D.C. Though rigid, inherent difficulties in each area made a 
poorly-administered school system inevitable, the separation- amounting to an administrative 
firewall- between these functions exacerbated poor administration. This uniquely Washingtonian 
structure was one in which all three branches of the federal government were somehow- 
sometimes in multiple ways- directly involved in the governance of the schools. These various 
nodes of power did not ever communicate in any genuine attempt to re-set the school system’s 
multiple dislocated joints, interacting only when absolutely necessary to fulfil mandated duties 
such as setting the budget. Even then, interactions were often simply internecine squabbles, 
where one branch of government attempted to assert dominance over others in what Diner has 
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labelled “continuous and often virulent” struggles.136 This meant that the education of the 
children of the nation’s capital was often merely a pawn in institutional power battles. 
 
That very little of this ineffectual structure of governance would change until the first iteration of 
D.C. Home Rule in the early 1970s- two-thirds of a century later- is telling of a system which 
was in almost every way unresponsive and unfit for its purpose. Nothing could be changed 
without a change in federal law- something to which vested interests consistently put paid, and 
D.C. lacked any federal representation with the political mandate or incentive to agitate for such 
change. This administrative complexity, inflexibility and chronic underfunding, when confronted 
with the huge demographic shifts and political issues of the mid-twentieth century, was a 
cocktail fatal to any hope of a decent public education system in D.C., for black children in 
particular. Amid all of this, an “apolitical”, white-majority Board of Education made for an 
institution ostensibly politically incapable of making any decisions to improve the situation of 
black pupils, while in any case being disinclined to do so at the expense of white convenience. 
This veneer of “objectivity” left little recourse for black citizens to enact change or improve their 
schools, as the Board hid its white-supremacist policies behind the supposedly value-neutral 
status quo. 
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IV: 1947-1954, Actors and Administration: Decision-Making and Maintaining Rigid 
Segregation in a Fluid City 
 
The origins of the D.C. Board of Education are prestigious. The first president of the original 13-
member Board of Trustees which oversaw the Washington city public schools at their outset in 
1805 was no less than the then President of the United States himself, Thomas Jefferson. Other 
members included future Supreme Court Justice Gabriel Duvall, several wealthy local plantation 
owners from Maryland and Virginia, and war hero Thomas Tingey. The Supreme Court room at 
the United States Capitol was the esteemed venue for the committee’s inaugural meeting.137 By 
1906, the Board had developed through various iterations into one which was theoretically 
immensely powerful with total oversight responsibility for both the black and white school 
systems, and could not be overruled in administrative matters of public education by anyone. 
However, as established previously, in reality it was fairly meek in its decision making and 
simply followed the inherited status quo paradigm of racial separation and the white supremacy 
inherent therein, which aligned with its own majority interests.  
 
The role of Superintendent of public schools was first provided for in 1869 by the City Council, a 
crucial factor in the modern development of the school system. In 1897, J. Ormond Wilson- 
himself a former Superintendent- described the role of the D.C. School Superintendent as to 
often be “chart, compass, captain, pilot, and man of all work, and will find himself in stormy 
weather sailing between Scylla and Charybdis”.138 It is clear then, that from its inception, the 
position of D.C. Superintendent was never that simply of a figurehead.  Though its expected 
duties shifted through various periods of national pedagogical progress-broadly from Chief 
Education Officer of schools to Chief Executive Officer- throughout the entirety of the twentieth 
century the Superintendent possessed significant power and responsibility within the decision-
making apparatus of the D.C. public schools.139 Similar to the Board, Superintendents of 
Education had a tendency to view their role as apolitical. As earlier elucidated, these actors 
were operating within the constraints of a rigid and convoluted system. However, at no point did 
either the Superintendents or the Boards of Education as a unit make any attempt at genuine 
equalisation of black and white education within this paradigm. By the mid-20th Century, the 
 
137 Wilson, ‘Eighty Years’, p.122. 
138 Ibid, p.149. 
139 Theodore J. Kowalski and Lars G. Bjork, ‘Role expectations of the District Superintendent: 
Implications for Deregulating Preparation and Licensing’ , Educational Leadership Faculty Publications, 
Paper 45, (2005), pp. 76- 79. 
42 
 
role of Hobart Corning as Superintendent had become that of CEO of the schools in every 
meaningful sense, with the Board of Education acting as a Board of Directors offering oversight 
and approving (often rubber-stamping) his administrative decisions, as the educational expert. 
 
While it is indisputable that these actors did their best to combat some of the overarching, 
universal problems which faced their school system such as overall, systemic underfunding- 
including protesting to Congress about low school budget allocations- when faced with the 
difficult circumstances which these structural outputs beyond their control created, the Boards of 
Education and Superintendents consistently took a white supremacist approach to education 
and the distribution of limited resources. These authorities prioritised white education, sacrificing 
the education of the District’s black children rather than spread the burden of the lack of 
resources evenly without regard to race. Without some element of Home Rule and concomitant 
democracy in school funding, Washington D.C.’s black children would never have a good 
education, as D.C. never had the resources apportioned consistently by fiscally-conservative 
Congresses which were necessary to provide one, but they could at least have had a better 
education- and one equal to that of their white peers- had these municipal administrators wished 
it so. The Board had the power to transfer resources as necessary between the black and white 
school divisions, but did so sparingly and inequitably.  While D.C.’s structural problems in 
education were unique and esoteric, this approach by those administering the system was 
consistent with that of other northern cities: these actors did not do what was within their power 
to improve black schooling in the city, even though they espoused ostensibly liberal views and 
policies with regard to racial equality. This pattern of decision-making was evident in the years 
between the end of the Second World War and the 1954 integration decision, and analysis of 
this period is crucial to our understanding of how the Board and Superintendent acted to 
maintain a rigidly segregated school system in a period of remarkable fluidity. An understanding 
of this period also feeds, crucially, into interpreting the Board and Superintendent’s later 
response to the Supreme Court mandating school desegregation. 
 
The post-war populous in Washington D.C. was one in flux, at a level unmatched by anywhere 
else in the country, even in the midst of a comprehensive national “Great Migration” from the 
rural South to the urban North. Indeed, the most significant trend of Washington D.C. was that 
of its demographics: shifting rapidly in manifold ways. The population overall was increasing at 
pace, but the black population was increasing with remarkable rapidity. The 1945 enrollment in 
the D.C. schools totalled 90,575 pupils. Of these, 38,304 (42.3%) were black, and 52,271 
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(57.7%) white. By 1954- the year of the integration court decision- the systemwide total 
enrollment was up to approximately 100,000 and had undergone a complete racial inversion: 
the school population was approximately 43% white and 57% black. Numerically, white 
enrollment had decreased by almost 20% but black enrollment had shot up by almost 50% and 
led to both an increase in the overall system’s enrollment and a transformation in its racial 
weighting, as the D.C. school population presaged that of the city itself and became majority-
black in the early 1950s.140 A natural- and, crucially, predictable- outcome was a significant 
strain on the dual school system as it was then constituted. Such a rigid and unresponsive 
system which already had insufficient resources and concentrated the weight of these shortfalls 
on young black shoulders was unable to cope with such fluidity. However, a crucial aspect of 
the historical interrogation of these events and the actors and structures involved is whether this 
rigidity was inherent and structural, or conveniently and continuously constructed racist artifice.  
 
Throughout this period, various measures point to significant and indisputable disparities and 
inequities between the two racial systems. It is important to enumerate these facts in the first 
instance. Per pupil spending, perhaps the clearest and most fundamental metric for the school 
authorities’ attitudes to educating the different races, was $1.07 per day for white pupils in the 
1946-47 school year, where only 84 cents was spent on educating their black peers.141 As 
things stood- or in many cases crumbled- in 1946, only 36% of the black school buildings had 
been constructed after the turn of the Century. The equivalent number of non-ancient school-
buildings for whites was still low, but meaningful higher at 57%. The black schools as a whole 
division were 8% over capacity and rising, while the white division was 27% under capacity and 
falling.142 Crumbling black buildings were bursting at the seams, while their generally newer 
white equivalents sat more than a quarter empty. The 1949 Strayer report further illustrated in 
granular detail the discrepancies between facilities in the two divisions. The Senior High 
schools, the final and arguably definitive in pupils’ development through the education system, 
were grossly unequally housed. The three black Senior High Schools all scored lower in the 
Report’s numerical “Educational Adequacy Score” than every single one of the eight white 
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Senior Highs. These three black schools- Dunbar, Cardozo, and Armstrong- all fell within the 
category of requiring “major improvements” to become even satisfactory facilities, while all but 
two of the eight white Senior High schools were deemed “very satisfactory”; the two outliers 
required only “minor improvements”. 143 In the 1950-51 school year, pupil to teacher ratios were 
imbalanced between the divisions- and favourably so towards whites- at every level. System-
wide, the ratio was 23.3 pupils to every teacher in the black divisions compared to 17.2 in the 
white divisions. The ratios at the junior high level were most egregious, where 28.4 black pupils 
shared a teacher while only 22.8 of their white counterparts did so.144 These ratios did not 
particularly improve: three years later the pupil to teacher ratios at junior high level remained 
disparate between the races. In 1953, it was 28.2 for blacks at that level and 22.7 for whites. 145 
Indeed, disparities between the black and white divisions continued right up to 1954, as an 
excess of 188 teachers existed in the white system while the black system had a shortage of 69 
educators, the white schools had a combined 12,051 spare seats where the black schools had a 
shortage of 6,405 seats. Almost half of the fifty black kindergartens were running part-time 
schedules due to overcrowding and underfunding while all fifty-nine white ones ran as normal. 
Black students were receiving an inferior education in an inferior system throughout these 
years.146  
 
However, these facts alone, while proving the inequalities between the systems, do little to 
inform as to their causes or facilitators; it would be remiss not to state that the authorities clearly 
had a difficult job in managing a dynamic system under heavy pecuniary restrictions. It is crucial 
to evaluate therefore: whether these merely unfortunate outcomes of the system’s rigidity failing 
to account for disproportionately high black population increases and as putting much of the 
strain of this population increase on the black system, or the result of deliberate decisions taken 
by school officials?  
 
Throughout this period, the authorities- particularly the Superintendent of Schools in his 
executive capacity- did little to either challenge the dual school system or work within its 
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restrictions order to provide black children a better, equal education. Tellingly, one local black 
parent activist group denounced the Superintendent, and encouraged the Board not to 
reappoint him to his position in 1951. The group scalded that “his recommendations concerning 
Board policy in relation to the students have, without exception, been directed at maintaining or 
strengthening the separation of the races”.147 An analysis of this period holds this assertion to 
be true: the Superintendent’s administrative decisions consistently and deliberately placed the 
needs of white supremacy- beyond the minimum separation ostensibly required by law- above 
the needs of black students whose education was in crisis. This theme is perhaps best 
illustrated in officials’ approaches to two school overcrowding crises during this period, which 
together demonstrate a pattern of refusal to consider disruptions to the white schools and their 
superiority as a necessary compromise in order to resolve serious issues in the black schools. 
Of course, these intentions were hidden behind cleverly-coded rhetoric of ‘following established 
policy’ and ‘educational soundness’. The first such episode was the situation at Browne Junior 
High School in 1947.  
 
Browne was the manifestation of the worst excesses of racist school governance. It was the 
most overcrowded of the overcrowded black schools at almost double its intended capacity; 
1,721 students sat, and tried to learn, in a building intended for 875.148 This level of 
overcrowding was so egregious that it drove the local community into action, and a community 
group of frustrated and highly motivated Browne parents was born: the Consolidated Parent 
Group. This group organised at the grassroots level, picketing the school, petitioning the Board, 
and engineering a school strike that peaked in December 1947 with around half of Browne 
students absent from class. These activities forced the authorities to take them, and the severity 
of the situation at Browne, seriously.149 The Superintendent, when confronted by the 
Consolidated Parent Group, blamed the overcrowding, and consequent double-shifts at the 
school- on “unpredictable growth of population” in the black school division. This growth was, 
however, not an “unpredictable” increase in enrollment in the slightest. In fact, the Washington 
Post ran a series of articles in 1945 which predicted significant increases in future enrollment, 
which chimed neatly with the pure demographic fact that both the black population of the city 
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and black school enrollment had been steadily and significantly increasing each year since at 
least 1940, according to the Board of Education’s own records.150 That a newspaper could 
predict such obvious trends in enrollment where the education experts could not seems highly 
improbable. Corning himself contradicted this two years later when discussing the situation at 
Cardozo Senior High, stating that “the Board of Education has long foreseen the need for new 
high schools for Divisions 10-13 (black divisions)”.151 Not a single member of the Board of 
Education- not even the three black members- lived in Northeast Washington where Browne 
was located. To them, and the Superintendent, the issue was one far removed: a problem in 
theory- numbers not matching estimates in a community in which they had no personal stake. 
Telling of this detachment and underlying views on racial hierarchy was the Superintendent’s 
statement that “absolute equality of educational opportunity is impossible… and may not 
reasonably be expected of any Board of Education” in response to the gaping chasm between 
the education provided white and black pupils, thereby actively contradicting the less convenient 
aspect of equality demanded by the “separate but equal” mandate, in order to uphold the racial 
superiority aspect. To prioritise separation over equality was a value judgement made by the 
authorities.152  
 
The Superintendent’s handling of the crisis at Browne, namely the priorities clearly underpinning 
his suggested solutions and his rejection of those offered by affected parties, are illustrative of 
an unwillingness to compromise the superior treatment of whites in the school system to any 
extent whatsoever to alleviate serious issues in the black schools. Supt. Corning’s proposed 
solution to the crisis of overcrowding at Browne was to offer up use of Blow and Webb as 
annexes in which to teach the overflow of students from Browne. Blow and Webb were both 
eight-room elementary schools, lacking in key facilities necessary for delivering junior high 
education. They lacked cafeterias, libraries, and in an encapsulation of the raft of indignities 
inflicted upon black students by the D.C. education authorities, the lavatory facilities there were 
built for small children and completely unsuitable for use by junior high-aged children. Blow and 
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Webb were also both located a considerable distance from the main Browne building, which a 
group of education experts eviscerated in an analysis of the transfer plans. These academics 
pointed out to the Board and Superintendent that this would cause “insurmountable difficulties in 
scheduling”; pupils attending these annexes would inexorably not receive a full day’s education 
due to the significant amounts of time travelling between these distant facilities. Further, these 
children would be at the mercy of inclement weather and vulnerable to traffic accidents or other 
urban dangers.153 These buildings were clearly not a functionally-appropriate solution to 
Browne’s issues. 
 
Both buildings were also nearing the end of their usable life: Blow was forty-one years old and 
Webb forty-seven. Webb and Blow were to be transferred as part of a broader plan to relieve 
overcrowding in the black divisions by re-allocating white buildings for black use. While 
superficially an example of the Board and Superintendent attempting to achieve some balance 
in the allocation of resources between the black and white divisions, they were in fact 
characteristic of an institutional view of the black system as inferior to the white. The average 
age of the five buildings to be transferred, including Blow and Webb, was forty-nine years old; 
the oldest of the buildings was built in the 1880s.154 This was no accident of circumstance: the 
Superintendent in fact himself stated, when discussing his approach to building transfers was to 
wait for buildings to become available through the “natural process of shifting and increasing 
population”, and admitted that such “natural” availability only occurred “on occasion”. This was 
effectively an admission of two things. Firstly, that the building transfers did not occur on any 
basis of equal provision, but rather in a ‘hand-me-down’ fashion. The white schools would only 
be transferred to black use as a matter of course when they had been wrung of their maximum 
utility in white education and were some combination of empty, ancient, and redundant. They 
would only be transferred when no longer needed by whites, and the opportunity cost of such a 
transfer to white interests was effectively zero. Secondly, this policy was a tacit admission of 
authorities’ commitment to allowing supposed ‘natural’ forces to dictate policy. This reluctance 
to be active in addressing the pressing needs of its black students was similar to that of other 
suburban authorities’ later approaches to school desegregation which prioritised the ‘natural’ 
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order of ‘neighbourhood schools’ and racially homogenous neighbourhoods over active racial 
integration. Of course, these population shifts and dynamics which in the D.C. case created 
‘available’ white schools were anything but natural and can in fact be attributed to racist white 
attitudes. As in the northern metropolises experiencing the engorging effects of The Great 
Migration, whites were fleeing both to white-enclave corners of D.C. itself and into its suburbs in 
a direct response to black in-migration.155 Further, this approach is indicative of a belief by the 
Superintendent that a racially-segregated, racially-hierarchical school system was itself the 
‘natural’ way, given the obvious logical flaw in stating that natural shifts would resolve problems 
in an artificially-constructed system. ‘Naturalness’ was in D.C., as elsewhere, subtle code for 
white supremacism.156 
 
In addition, the Superintendent in his various reports and responses to criticisms of his Browne 
relief proposals was deliberately misleading, disingenuous, and biased in favour of sustaining 
the racially-hierarchical status quo. As well as the previously discussed falsehood that the 
overcrowding crisis in the black schools was “unpredictable”, Supt. Corning made false 
equivalencies between the overcrowding at Browne and decades-earlier overcrowding and 
consequent double-shifts at white schools in order to ‘prove’ that such occurrences were 
“unfortunate” but supposedly ‘colorblind’ outcomes. Corning cited examples of overcrowding at 
five white Senior High Schools. All of these instances were long-resolved: two more than two 
decades previous, two a decade previous, and one four years previous.157 As well as being 
outdated, these examples were also not analogous to the situation at Browne. These white 
double-shifts all lasted less than five years- most considerably less- whereas Browne had been 
running double-shifts for seven years, with no sign of relief. Additionally, these earlier double-
shifts were not systematic. That is to say, they were due to the genuine demographic 
microclimate in their area and did not occur at times when the white system as a whole was 
overcrowded, whereas the Browne situation was symptomatic of broader overcrowding in the 
black schools. Indeed, while these white double-shifts occurred at times when significant 
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numbers of black pupils also experienced them.158 In 1947, this was not the case: almost the 
entirety of the burden was on black children. At elementary level, for example, only 418 of the 
6,743 elementary and junior-high schoolers on double-shifts were white.159 Double shifts at 
Browne resulted in students there receiving a reduced education of four-and-a-half hours per 
day, rather than the standard six.160 
 
The Superintendent further attempted to abdicate responsibility for the situation and point 
towards the financial and budgetary structures as constraints on his and the Board’s ability to 
provide equal schooling. While this was clearly and undeniably an issue, as their 1948 proposed 
budget which had included $8.59million for capital expenditures- 56.3% of which were on the 
black divisions- was eroded to less than a quarter of that requested in the final congressional 
budget allocated.161 Attempting to secure improvements to the black system in this way were 
symptomatic of the authorities’ whites-first approach in that such extra appropriations for funds 
need not have necessarily taken away from the white schools, where building transfers 
theoretically did. They were, however, totally unrealistic given the consistent, well-known 
tendency for these budget requests to be cut to ribbons through the gauntlet of the budgetary 
process. In making this argument, Corning also manipulated the figures in order to make the 
budgetary figures seem more generous to the black division than was actually the case. He 
used the 1940 census figures to calculate the relative expenditure per capita for each race, 
rather than the up-to-date 1947 enrollment figures which of course showed a much larger black 
population and to which he clearly would have had access. This had the result of artificially 
inflating the black spending per capita requested in the budget and make it seem overly 
generous.162  
 
As securing extra capital appropriations failed, the only solution to improve the black schools 
and relieve overcrowding lay in transfers from the white division beyond that of simply 
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redundant old buildings. However, the Superintendent, in various reports to the Board and 
statements to the public refused to consider any alternative to his proposed Blow and Webb 
building transfers, and actively misrepresented circumstances to justify not transferring a more 
modern or useful white building. The alternative to Corning’s proposed transfer was that of Eliot 
Junior High being transferred instead. This option was favoured by the parents and students at 
Browne as it was close to Browne, was under-attended, and an existing junior high school with 
the correct facilities. It was also however much newer than Blow and Webb- built in 1932- and 
therefore much more of an asset of value within the white system.163 When pressed by parents 
and black activist groups, the Superintendent persisted with his insistence that transferring Eliot 
to black use was not “desirable or practical”. He used the impossible to disprove strawman 
argument that such a transfer could lead to “racial antagonism”- a convenient, universally 
applicable argument against essentially any building transfer which gave the Superintendent 
cover for his racist intent, as he could essentially argue that while he himself was not racist, 
white communities were and therefore compromising white interests was not possible. He 
essentially stated this, in saying that “(if Eliot were transferred,) the Board of Education would 
then be faced with the opposition of two racial elements instead of one”; blacks alone being 
antagonised was acceptable, but whites were a different matter.  
 
A further barrage of half-baked justifications was given for not transferring Eliot specifically. One 
was that it would “not be possible to disperse the Eliot Senior High School population” to other 
schools, without stating any practical justification as to why. Corning further argued that a 
proposal to transfer all the existing Eliot pupils to the white Eastern Junior High to be taught in 
empty classrooms there and appropriating Eliot’s buildings to the black excess from Browne 
was impossible, as there was not enough room for the Eliot pupils there. This assertion 
assumed that existing classes at Eastern, where the average class size was an incredibly low 
18, could not be merged.164 Hypocritically and perhaps most tellingly, Corning further argued 
that “the required kinds of rooms for a junior high school are not available” at Eastern for the 
theoretical transferred Eliot pupils, though similar logic of course did not prevent his suggestion 
of the Browne Junior High excess being educated in elementary facilities at Blow and Webb, as 
different standards were clearly applied to the quality of black and white facility provision. 
Finally, Corning used the circular logic that the permanent transfer of any buildings such as Eliot 
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would essentially relieve the Browne situation a little too well, and would damage attempts in the 
long-term to secure more funding for black schools; essentially that overcrowding the situation 
at Browne and elsewhere was actually in black interests as it strengthened the case for new 
black buildings in the budget, completely ignoring the clear reality of budgetary unpredictability 
and as well as irreparable damage of such overcrowding to an entire generation’s education in 
the medium-term.165  All in all, what Donald Rae has described as “a clumsy attempt to maintain 
the status quo” by Corning and the Board was somewhat more sinister- a calculated attempt to 
insulate the white system from the problems of the black system- and refusal to make any 
concessions to black interests whatsoever which might have inconvenienced whites or provided 
an equal education. It was only when threatened with a lawsuit which they feared might set a 
precedent for racial integration (Carr v Corning) that the Board and Superintendent suddenly 
managed to find a more acceptable solution in the form of an empty existing building near 
Browne.166 Two years later, the situation of overcrowding at Browne remained “critical”.167 
 
Events two years after Browne demonstrated that the approach to overcrowding in black 
schools which refused to compromise superior white education was a pattern of the authorities’ 
whites-first attitude towards school transfers in the context of black school overcrowding, rather 
than a one-off. The situation at Cardozo Senior High School in 1950 was similar in many ways.  
 
While the other two black Senior High schools were also overcrowded- Dunbar by 78 pupils (5% 
of capacity) and Armstrong by 170 (16% of capacity)- Cardozo was so severely overcrowded as 
to be operating triple shifts. It had 1,796 pupils enrolled in a building intended for 1,040 as of 
September 1949. It was a staggering 73% over capacity. 168 A student who attended the school 
at the peak of its overcrowding described the scenes at Cardozo as “kids hanging out the doors 
and out the windows, sitting on windowsills… there weren’t enough seats and it was so 
small.”169 Indeed, though Corning conceded in one of several reports over a prolonged battle 
with parent groups over the situation at Cardozo that it was “crowded”, he still insisted that 
through excellent management of the situation by the school’s staff, “individual groups still 
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receive a full school day of six hours”.170 Quantitatively this may have  been true, but it is fairly 
clear to any observer- never mind an educational expert- that such extreme overcrowding made 
for a significantly worse education qualitatively than elsewhere in the system.  
 
Again, as with Browne, Corning points to issues at the white elementary school level in an 
attempt to portray this as a ‘colorblind’ issue resulting directly from the fact that “school 
construction has not kept pace with population trends”, and contends that this has led to a 
“backlog of needs for school buildings in both the white and colored divisions”. Corning’s 
proffering of the roughly equal burden of the double shifts caused by overcrowding at the 
elementary level- as 2,123 white and 1,954 black elementary students were on double-shifts at 
that time was a sleight of hand. Once again, he pointed to a single exception to the pattern of 
white school underpopulation and black school overpopulation and attempted to use it to negate 
the clear systematic issues at play. While it must again be stated that the white system also had 
significant issues and deficiencies due to the structural problems with school administration, the 
fact that every single black Senior High School was overcrowded was clearly the greater issue 
at play.  Further, the Superintendent deliberately failed here to account for the momentum of 
these population shifts: just three years later- and decidedly predictable from the trajectory of 
the racial dynamics of the city and education system- the white school system at every level 
including elementary was underpopulated, and the black system overcrowded. In 1953, the 
white system had over 12,000 empty seats while the black system had a shortage of 6,405. 171  
 
In fact, it is no coincidence that the Superintendent’s focus was solely on the then-existing 
situation in his decision making, rather than reacting to the obvious fact that medium- and long-
term trends indicated a need for white buildings to be transferred for black use. Ostensibly, it 
might have been simple incompetence that led to this approach of assessing the merits of 
school transfers strictly on the situation as it stood at that time rather than anticipating future 
needs, and pure coincidence that this benefited the white at the expense of the black system. 
This approach delayed white-to-black school transfers until they were immediately and 
absolutely necessary (and almost always too late). However, Corning’s manipulation of data to 
justify his actions points to ulterior motives. His assessment of options suggested by various 
parties involved laying out the consequences of transferring different white-used buildings for 
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black use. In doing so, he points out that any of the proposed white building transfers would 
have caused the black Senior High schools to collectively have a surplus of between 1,396 and 
2,496 spaces by 1951 due to the impending completion of the new Spingarn Senior High for 
black students. However, these assessments were made based on the 1949 enrollment data, 
with no projected increase in black enrollment whatsoever in the intervening two years.172 The 
1949 Strayer report to Congress on the D.C. public schools- of which the Superintendent no 
doubt had knowledge, as he referenced it elsewhere in his report- had predicted a rise in 
population at the black Senior high level of almost 1,000 pupils by 1951.173 Such estimates, and 
reasonable assumptions that this pattern would continue, easily justified the transfer of at least 
one white building in addition to the new Spingarn, as advocated by the parent activist groups. 
The Superintendent clearly attempted to selectively use certain figures to preserve white 
advantage.  
 
The Superintendent’s preferred solution, as with Browne, was to use an elementary school- 
Park View- as an annexe for a pupil overflow of 500 from Cardozo. As with the Blow and Webb 
solution to Browne, these facilities were clearly inappropriate for the provision of Senior High 
education. However, even more egregiously, this solution did not even fully relieve 
overcrowding at Cardozo; it would have left the main campus almost 300 pupils over capacity 
and rising. Further, Park View had earlier that year already been reassigned to the black system 
for use as an elementary school, and though admittedly underutilised as such (enrollment was 
c. 53% of capacity), the Superintendent’s idea that 500 Cardozo pupils should occupy the 
remaining classrooms there while keeping the elementary contingent in the other half of the 
building was clearly an attempt to solve the problem with existing black resources rather than 
transfer white ones.174 Indeed, the Park View elementary parents themselves saw through this, 
decrying it as unfair and “just a means of trying to avoid turning over Central High School or 
some other white school”.175  
 
The most obvious solution, and the one the Consolidated Parent Group advocated for, was the 
transfer of Central High School from white to black use. The Superintendent argued consistently 
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against this, even in his third report on the matter and amid consistent vehement criticism from 
affected groups, with arguments based on his misleading data which- as earlier established- did 
not account for predicted population increases. His argument was circuitous and confusing- 
perhaps deliberately so in order to deflect from criticism, shrouded behind supposed technical 
expertise and language of “educational soundness”-  but essentially boiled down to the idea that 
transferring the Central High building would damage ongoing attempts to extract congressional 
appropriations to fund new replacements for Armstrong and the existing Cardozo building.176 
This was clearly nonsensical, as transferring Central would have provided concrete 
improvement to the black system, whereas hypothetical new buildings at the mercy of the 
budgetary process in the future were much less tangible- Spingarn had taken twenty years.177 
Corning further adjudicated that any potential temporary transfer of buildings such as Central 
would also be “palliative” and too disruptive to be educationally sound. 178 
 
Any transfer of Central was particularly emotive to whites because of the tradition and identity 
attached to it in the white popular memory. It was the jewel in the crown of the white school 
system at the time of its construction, and its position as a cultural cornerstone for whites in its 
vicinity and across the city led to significant white advocacy from parents, alumni, and other 
supporters with “almost totalitarian interest in their school”.179  As with Eliot Junior High with the 
Browne overcrowding situation, Central High was clearly an asset the white schools would have 
missed, and one the Superintendent felt extraordinary pressure to retain for white use, 
regardless of black needs.  
 
That Central was eventually transferred in May 1950 was testament not to the Superintendent 
who fought it at every turn to preserve white interests, but the voracious activism of the parents 
of the badly-treated black students. This transfer also did not alleviate the situation of 
overcrowding, as Central replaced Cardozo rather than adding to it; the original Cardozo 
building was deemed no longer usable due to its poor conditions.180 However, the nature of the 
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way the decision was reached, against the wishes of the Superintendent, by the Board of 
Education is worthy of examination in the broader context of the relationship between the Board 
and its Superintendent, and as it ostensibly contradicts the idea that the Superintendent and 
Board were consistently united in their actions by a shared interest in preserving white 
superiority, as earlier asserted. 
 
The reality of the situation was that the Superintendent was, throughout the Cardozo debate, 
fairly isolated in his position. Even his deputy for the black schools, Garnet C. Wilkinson, a 
“steadfast” proponent of the dual school system, supported the transfer of Cardozo and believed 
it would not damage the black school building program.181 The relationship between the Board 
and Superintendent was undoubtedly complex; there was much tension and disagreement in 
between Corning and the leadership of the Board in the post-war period as they battled for 
authority and the leadership of the Board attempted to limit Corning’s power.182 This had been 
going on since at least 1949, when Corning and Board President Sharpe had a dispute over the 
former’s authority over library books.183 This power struggle culminated in 1952 when Corning’s 
reappointment to his role was being considered by the Board, and the President and Vice 
President attempted unsuccessfully to remove him: they lost the vote by six votes to three. 
Having lost this power battle, Chairman Sharpe had to be talked out of resigning on the spot by 
the judge in charge of appointing the Board members and Vice President Lee stated that he 
would not seek to renew his own term.184 Thus, the Board’s overruling of Corning’s objections to 
transferring Central in March of 1950 can be characterised at least partly as an episode in this 
ongoing battle between Board and Superintendent, rather than a genuine desire by the majority 
of the Board for improvement to the black schools. Certainly, the Board was not reluctant to flex 
its administrative muscles and assert its own authority in overruling the Superintendent, even if 
this might not have been their ideal issue over which to battle. 
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Indeed, the Board had previously shown a reluctance to intervene in the debate over the 
transfer of Central. The Parks and Grounds subcommittee had voted 2-1 on 31st January 1950 
to recommend overruling the Superintendent’s continued insistence that the building should not 
be transferred for black use.185 This was a decision made in the subcommittee along racial lines: 
the two black subcommittee members voted to transfer Central and the third (white) member 
initially concurred but later recanted. However, the Board of Education itself did not act on this, 
and postponed a vote of the full Board on the matter for three consecutive meetings.186 The 
Board eventually relented and held a vote at the meeting of March 8th at which it voted by five 
to two in favour of the transfer.187 The issue of Central had become a huge political thorn in the 
side of the Board, who was more directly responsive to such pressures than the Superintendent 
who was one degree further removed from it. A legal case- Haley v. Sharpe- challenging the 
failure to transfer Central and resultant poor education of pupils at the overcrowded Cardozo 
school was working its way through the courts, and it is likely that- as documented with the 
transfer of Browne two years earlier, the Board was motivated by to avoid the negative damage 
to its reputation a condemning court decision would do to its institutional reputation. The legal 
documents for this case showed an intent by the plaintiffs to launch a particularly rigorous attack 
on the Superintendent and the Board’s inaction and racist practice.188 The similarities in that 
respect were noted by observers and supporters of the transfer, such as the Chair of the 
Federation of Civic Associations. 189 
 
Ultimately, the eventual transfer of Central from white to black use does not contradict the 
pattern of this period. Building transfers were not uncommon: “Between 1939 and 1954, thirty 
buildings were transferred. Between 1950 and 1954 alone, nine elementaries, two junior highs 
and one senior high were transferred.”190 These transfers, however, were not done on the basis 
of maintaining equality between black and white education, but rather to maintain a bare 
minimum standard in the black schools in order to avoid significant legal or political backlash, of 
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which Central is a prime example. The way this decision was continually obfuscated, delayed, 
and then eventually reached, however, does illustrate the motivations and machinations of the 
authorities involved as consistently prioritising white education over black. 
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V: Hollow Promises of Hope: The Response to Bolling and the District’s 
“Desegregation Plan” 
 
The Board, the Superintendent, and most citizen advocacy groups welcomed the Supreme 
Court decision with ostensibly open arms, in a marked contrast to their distinctly and 
unmistakably clasped-arm stance, girded by their apparent adherence to a clearly outlined legal 
requirement for segregated schools, towards earlier advocacy to the same ends.  
 
Whereas, given the authorities' obfuscation of attempts to transfer white schools to black use in 
the post-war years, one might have expected at least a subtle degree of evasion or qualification, 
yet at various the Board meetings and in official communications, such obstructionism never 
presented itself in official rhetoric. This was striking, as the Superintendent and the Board had 
previously gone to great lengths to ensure that the system they oversaw remained entirely 
segregated to white advantage, and not just to the letter of the law as required by their 
positions, as demonstrated previously in the post-war approach to overcrowding at the Browne 
and Cardozo Schools. 
 
The Board and Superintendent had little choice but to embrace the Bolling verdict as policy, at 
least outwardly and in its official stratagem. Optics and political realities forbade open evasion or 
obfuscation, as the federal judges who appointed the Board and were colleagues of the justices 
of the Supreme Court, and the President who ultimately signed off their budgets would not have 
allowed this. Eisenhower was ultimately the chief executive of the District, and had been an 
open, vocal advocate for desegregation in the city’s public accommodations, having declared 
his intention for Washington D.C. to be “showpiece for the nation” in that regard.191 The day 
following the Brown decisions of which Bolling was a part, Eisenhower acted to apply pressure 
and called the District Commissioners, imploring that he felt the District should be a “model for 
the nation”  when it came to desegregating its public school system. 192 However, the reality of 
the D.C. school authorities' approach to forming the concrete remedial response to the 
integration court was one of continuing to treat white convenience as taking precedence over 
the black educational need for true integration. 
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Though the Board’s official rhetoric shifted in a complete volte face from that of strict 
segregationism to liberal desegregation at the drop of a gavel, what remained was a 
Superintendent- facilitated by the Board- continuing a white supremacist project through 
deliberate, technical means. The “integration plan” was no such thing, as it contained no active 
integratory measures, as was also the case in so many of the “liberal” northern cities. In fact, the 
defining aspect of active policy in the plan was allowing whites to essentially opt-out of 
integration. Where radical and drastic action was required to uproot and completely replant an 
education system built upon a century of white supremacy in order to give D.C.’s black students 
a genuinely equitable education, a passive approach with little to no compensatory action was 
taken. Though overt racial barriers were removed, their legacies were not undone. The D.C. 
schools continued, to all intents and purposes, to be segregated.   
 
The Board and Superintendent had been anticipating, and planning for at some level, a potential 
future merger of the dual school for more than two full years before the Brown decisions of May 
1954. At the Board meeting of February 1952, presentations were given by interested parties 
regarding the future of the racially-segregated system, and members debated the prospect of 
asking the Superintendent to make a report on the longer-term viability of a dual school system 
which was, as one white member- Dr. Gannon- stated: “economically and democratically 
unsound”. While this was not necessarily the majority-view of the Board, it was clear to all that 
given their struggles to obtain from Congress the extra funding necessary to run a racially-
segregated system, and increasing legal complexities such as an ongoing and unresolved 
question of whether teacher transfers across the racial divide were permissible under the law, 
that a unified system was inevitable at some point in the relatively near future.193 That is not to 
say that integration was a desire of the majority of the Board, and the seven to two vote should 
not necessarily be read as such. Indeed, several of the members who voted in the affirmative 
did so only after asking clarifying questions as to the nature of the study: namely, that it was 
merely an exploration of facts relating to the existing state of the dual-school system, rather than 
any kind of blueprint for desegregation.194   
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As then-Assistant Superintendent Carl Hansen later insinuated in of these early moves to 
consider the future viability of the dual-school system, they were not driven by a liberalising 
majority within the Board itself, but rather outside factors.195 In fact, requesting that the 
Superintendent evaluate- in the most static way possible- the economic and social viability of 
the racially-separate system was the very minimum action the Board could have taken at the 
time. Pro-integration activists had been urging the Board to “begin the process now” in order to 
ensure that when integration, perceived by many as an inevitability, did occur, the District was 
prepared.196 The many speakers who advocated at the Board meeting of February 1952 for 
these initial steps to be taken, along with the broader climate of the increasing momentum of 
“local and national attacks upon racial discrimination” which would ultimately reach a “dramatic 
crescendo” by 1954 were already powerful.197 In a city where theaters were desegregated in 
1948, and playgrounds and public recreational facilities gradually so between 1949 and 1952, it 
would have been difficult for the Board of Education to publicly oppose such a fact-finding 
report. 198 However, this factual report was later stifled behind the scenes and was never carried 
out by the Superintendent, a fact which activist groups resented and objected to, such as the 
Washington Friends Meetings, who wrote to the Board implying that the Board’s majority-white 
membership was attempting to “stifle and secrete pertinent” data by “rescinding the order for a 
study of the possibilities of integration”.199 
 
The lack of zeal with which the majority of the Board approved tentative measures ostensibly to 
aid future integration is further evidenced by their approach to the ‘Handbook on Intergroup 
Education’, which they approved the concept of in late 1951, and the final version of on 16th 
April 1952. This was, as with the Superintendent’s fact-finding report, not an action generated 
from within the Board, but rather the result of years of advocacy by outside groups. The 
Handbook was not specifically racial or integratory in its nature or intent. It was “planned to be 
used within the policy of segregation” and was not solely related to race: other social divisions 
such as religion, social status, and economic status were also included. At the meeting which 
approved the creation of the Handbook, no member of the subcommittee of the Board 
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discussed integration as the objective. Indeed, most of the content relating to race relations and 
the potential for interracial cooperation in education was driven and shaped by a local advocacy 
group called the Citizens’ Committee on Intercultural Relations, rather than by members of the 
Board or the educational experts in the Superintendent’s administrative department. 200 
 
Later that year, in December 1952, the Board discussed the future of the racially-segregated 
school system in light of the new legal case challenging its legality under the Constitution: 
Bolling v Sharpe, which would go on to be one of the companion cases adjudicated by the 
Supreme Court in the Brown decision of April 1954. It was broadly acknowledged at this 
meeting by a majority of the membership that this case, along with the pervasive climate of 
desegregationism, made the integration of D.C. schools a “distinct possibility at some time in the 
future, near or far”.201 After questioning whether such action might jeopardize their legal case 
and several white members and the Superintendent himself seeking to clarify that the meeting 
would be entirely “advisory” and not binding, the Board agreed to hold a meeting to discuss the 
“hypothetical mechanics” of integration, should it be ordered.202 This special meeting, however, 
did not occur until six months later, on the 7th May 1953, once again demonstrating that the 
Board’s majority was in no hurry to consider integration; the Board’s membership clearly 
recognised that it had to be seen to take cursory steps towards such goals but did so with little 
commitment and in a largely perfunctory way. Similarly, much of the broader work done to 
prepare for integration was done by outside groups, not the Board or Superintendent. A series 
of seminars held on a voluntary basis for teachers and administrators throughout 1953 and 
1954 which dealt with issues expected to arise in an integrated system were run by the 
American Friends Service Committee, and though he clearly feeling obliged to start “planning” 
for a potential desegregation by early 1953, Superintendent Corning’s preparations consisted of 
little more than monthly staff meetings conceived around the vague concept of generating 
“guiding principles”, with little substantive or tangible output. 203 
 
At the May 1953 meeting itself, the Board heard from various prominent citizens of the District, 
though as the meeting lasted only forty-five minutes, it is hard to make any claim that the 
meeting was of any real depth or constituted anything more than a cosmetic activity on the 
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Board’s part.204 Members did not question the speakers, nor were the speakers permitted to 
question or discuss one another’s presented ideas or experiences. In short, the meeting was 
most certainly not an earnest attempt by the Board to delve into the complexities of the issue of 
desegregation or reach consensuses to be applied in the future. Despite this, some of the 
contributions by speakers were of note, particularly those of several black citizens. What was 
broadly agreed upon by these speakers was that such a process should “happen quickly”: as 
Dr. Herbert C. Marshall- a prominent Georgetown physician- put it: “a series of mass meetings 
(following an integration decision) would stir up and becloud the entire picture”.205 Further, these 
black representatives concurred as to the necessity of any desegregation being simple and 
comprehensive. Mrs Robert G. McGuire, a member of a prominent black D.C. family and herself 
a former member of the Board of Education stressed the importance that the process be “total” 
and “system-wide”.206 The contribution which would later become most pertinent in the context 
of Corning’s post-Bolling integration plan came from Dr Phillip T. Johnson, a member of the 
Washington Urban League and one of the Board’s black members at the time, who stressed 
that newly-zoned catchment boundaries post-desegregation must be “clearly and strictly 
adhered to… to allow administrators conscience free and non-evasive responses to any 
challenges”.207 Finally, and perhaps most illustratively, Mrs. Frances M. Wood expressed her 
concern that the educational establishment- The Board and Superintendent- was detached 
entirely from the experiences of black citizens, and that this could be a hindrance in their 
execution of any future integration order: “We feel that maybe if you would among yourselves 
open your minds and sort of get to know us better, the matter of putting integration into effect in 
the public schools would be no problem”.208 
 
When the Brown decisions were handed down by the Supreme Court on 17th May 1954, the 
D.C. Board of Education and Superintendent were certainly not taken by surprise. As the Brown 
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decisions compelled the states to integrate their school systems under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so a corollary in Bolling specifically required that the 
District of Columbia do the same according to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. As 
the Brown decision famously contained no specific remedy or standard for desegregation, 
neither of course did the single page, two hundred word ruling in Bolling.209 The D.C. authorities 
were thus required to interpret desegregation, and apply it to a dynamic, underfunded school 
system of over 100,000 pupils.210 The response from these authorities was immediate. Within 
eight days of the decision being handed down, a special meeting of the Board of Education had 
been convened, established a firm “Statement of Principles” to shape the nature of 
desegregation and facilitate prompt action, and instructed the Superintendent to immediately 
begin planning the steps necessary to desegregate the schools.  
 
The special meeting at which the “Statement of Principles” was adopted was, however, not 
uneventful or perfunctory. The black members of the Board wanted to see the Superintendent’s 
initial report (a general document outlining the general approach and broad strokes of his plans 
rather than the specific, detailed integration plan he would later present) in advance of the 
meeting in order to allow them time to analyse its contents and thereby utilise the meeting itself 
to critique the proposals and as Dr. Butcher, one of the most outspoken integrationist members 
of the Board stated, to “facilitate prompt action”. 211 The white majority of the Board obstructed 
this, and the Superintendent argued that presenting his report to everyone at the same time- 
press and public included- was preferable as this would allow him to dynamically illustrate the 
report “with maps” to provide a better understanding.212 What came out of this was essentially a 
compromise, whereby a subcommittee of the Board would draft its own “Statement of 
Principles” for desegregation, which Dr. Butcher demanded should be “clear and unequivocal”, 
and another member argued should “transcend any details of a proposed plan by the 
Superintendent”, which the Board could use in “guiding it in consideration of the 
Superintendent’s plan”.213 The Statement of Principles was to be presented at the same time- 
the special meeting on 25th May- as the Superintendent’s initial desegregation report, in order 
to compensate for the fact that members could not see the latter in advance and provide them 
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with some element of control over the plan going into the meeting. While the Superintendent 
argued that this was not necessary and would cover much of the same ground as his own report 
which was not itself a detailed integration plan but similarly a set of guiding principles, he did not 
actively oppose it. The drafting of the Statement of Principles was narrowly approved by four 
votes to three with the Chair and Deputy Chair abstaining and the black membership making up 
the bulk of the yes votes.214  Even though the Statement was effectively a compromise to 
placate the black membership which, led vigorously by Dr. Butcher, sought assurances that the 
Superintendent would be strongly integrationist in his report, there was little compromise from 
the white majority, and the Statement’s drafting attracted only one white vote. When presented 
to the Board and adopted, the Statement was largely as firm and unequivocal as Butcher had 
hoped, requiring amongst other things that “no pupil of the public schools shall be favored or 
discriminated against in any matter or manner … by reason of race or color”. Even this 
statement, however, fell short of demanding rigid adherence to the new, “desegregated” school 
boundaries and allowed exceptions for “the most necessitous reasons or for the public 
convenience”, handing the Superintendent a huge degree of discretion in what constituted 
“necessitous reasons” or “the public convenience”.215 Ultimately, the superficially liberal step of 
adopting these principles should not be viewed as an organic act of the majority of the Board 
intended to make segregation truly equitable or indicative of a strong integratory mood, but 
rather as a compromise forced by the tireless advocacy of a minority of the Board to those ends. 
Even then, the final version did not compel the Superintendent to any particular action or 
approach due to its broad caveats. As previously demonstrated in his attitudes to building 
transfers, the Superintendent had a history of promoting white interests at the expense of black 
students and shrouding such manoeuvres in language of educational expertise.216 These 
principles left the door open for similar acts in obfuscation of desegregation in the name of 
educational necessity or public convenience.   
 
As well as the Board’s adoption of its Statement of Principles at the special meeting to react to 
the Court decisions, held on 25th May, such was the volume of information and contributions 
from both board members and interested outside parties that it was necessary to call the 
meeting to recess and continue it the following week on June 2nd. It was at this meeting that 
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Corning’s initial integration plan was presented. An editorial in the Washington Afro American 
the day before had predicted that a majority of the Board’s membership was “perturbed” by the 
plan and that this would result in Corning “taking the worst spanking at the hands of the Board 
since he has been superintendent”. Specifically, it was assumed that a majority of five: the three 
black members and two white liberal ones would be dissatisfied with Corning’s failure to set the 
date of integration earlier than September 1955 and his assertion that achieving it by September 
of 1954 would require additional funding. The Afro American also predicted that transfers were 
to be made mandatory in all but a few exceptions, and that pupils would not simply be allowed 
to remain where they were until graduation.217 These predictions placed far too much faith in the 
white liberals on the Board.  
 
At the meeting on the 2nd June, after much discussion and debate- particularly on the part of 
Dr. Margaret Butcher, by far the most forceful voice for the District’s black children on the 
Board- the Board voted five to three entirely along racial lines to deny a motion to request that 
the Superintendent redraft his report to be more ambitious, and address the shortfalls pointed 
out by the Afro American and others. Dr Butcher decried her fellow (specifically white) Board 
members, stating that this move represented “a new low in public education”. 218 In the end, the 
result of more than five hours of discussion over two separate meetings was the adoption of the 
Superintendent’s report, as was, in convenient deference to the Superintendent’s expertise by 
the Board’s white majority. The next steps approved by the Board were for the Superintendent 
to complete the rezoning of the District’s school catchment areas by July 1st, and for him to 
present a full-time schedule for “complete integration in all its phases” at the next regular Board 
meeting on June 23rd. 219 
 
The full timeline for desegregation presented by Corning at the June 23rd Board meeting was 
one which was to all appearances already set steadily and earnestly in motion. The 
Superintendent went to great pains to highlight the steps already taken up to that point, 
including the temporary merging of the Boards of Examiners, notice of a merger given to the 
principals of the teaching colleges, a complete tabulation of the data of all of the district’s circa 
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100,000 pupils, and the “preliminary steps” to effect some initial pupil transfers.220 These were 
however largely superficial acts, with little concrete integratory activity having occurred, and little 
in the way of permanent structural changes made. In fact, the majority of these were acts of 
tinkering, largely or entirely preparatory, and could or perhaps should have been done in 
advance of the Court decisions had the Superintendent wanted to give desegregation the best 
basis upon which to be implemented as quickly as possible. In fact, though the Superintendent 
and the Board had known that integration had been a distinct possibility for at least two years, it 
was perhaps summative of the Superintendent’s deliberately neglectful approach to such 
preparations that these preparations were left unmade until expressly and inexorably required 
by law. At the meeting of 19th May 1954, when prodded by the suggestion that a good 
administrator “would have been preparing himself on this subject for a long time,'' Corning 
responded that he had been “preparing for weeks”, rather than the months or even years 
implied by the member’s barb.221 
 
Crucially, the detailed plan and timeline presented by Corning at the June 23rd meeting was not 
by any measure immediate. It was, despite his claims to colleagues at the first interracial 
meetings of school staff in the immediate aftermath of Bolling that “complete desegregation of 
all schools is to be accomplished with least possible delay”, a distinctly gradualist approach.222  
Though the Superintendent accepted that he could draw the new school boundaries well in 
advance of the new school year, by July 1st, the school year 1954-55 was to be used as a 
transitional, rather than transformational, one. Corning planned for September that year that 
only new entrants to the school system- i.e. those entering at the Kindergarten level from pre-
school or moving to the city from elsewhere- would attend schools according to the newly 
established zoning. There was extremely limited active transferring of pupils to newly-zoned 
schools at the start of the 1954-55 school year. Some 2,803 pupils were to be transferred from 
overcrowded former Division II (black) schools to under-utilised former Division I (white) 
schools: 1503 at the elementary level, 844 at the junior high level, and 460 in the senior highs. 
However, these transfers were carried out within the same paradigmatic administrative priorities 
as the school building transfers between the racial divisions earlier that decade: to relieve 
overcrowding, not to actively improve the lot of black students, the vast majority of whom 
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remained in schools worse than their white peers due to decades of systematic neglect under 
the segregated system. The number of pupils to be transferred at the start of that school year in 
order to remedy their having to travel excessively long distances to their school and allow them 
to attend closer ones now zoned to them was around 100. This brought the total number of 
students to be transferred in September 1954 to under 3,000: less than three percent of the total 
enrollment of the public schools. 223 
 
Superintendent Corning justified the lack of large-scale change in the first year after Bolling as 
being all that could practically be done and indicated that to achieve integration in September 
1954 would be administratively impossible. This was an assertion for which he failed to give any 
evidence or any coherent explanation beyond his own instinctive judgment, even though 
Corning had no experience in the process of integrating a school system. Dr Butcher took 
Corning to task over this assumption and accused him, correctly, of having “simply stated that it 
could not be done, but not proved it”.224 Butcher was alone in her objections as the other two 
black members- Colonel Hamilton and Mr Willams- chose to essentially support Corning’s 
assertions about the unviability of faster integration and therefore supported his presented 
integration schedule, stating respectively that “the steps outlined in the Superintendent’s time 
schedule are in the direction of progress” and that the Superintendent had convinced that he 
would “do anything that can be done by September”.225 Dr. Butcher, though isolated, was 
unrelenting. She eviscerated the Superintendent’s plan as “a report not on integration but on the 
subject of relief”: Corning was operating within the same paradigms as under the dual-school 
system by simply addressing the very worst excesses of racial inequity rather than the drastic 
structural changes necessary to counteract a century of accumulated and entrenched racial 
disparities. Further, Corning’s decision to take a thirty-day vacation along with his entire 
administrative staff that Summer provided yet more evidence that he was not in fact doing 
everything possible to achieve integration at the earliest date. When challenged by Dr. Butcher 
on the effect of this holiday on integration, Corning claimed perversely and counterfactually that 
“in his considered opinion,'' integration “could not be done any quicker”, even if his staff worked 
all Summer. Butcher’s concrete, if slightly pugnacious, suggestions such as hiring someone to 
cover the Superintendent’s role while he vacationed were dismissed out of hand by the rest of 
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the Board.226 While this Summer break for the administrative staff was entirely ordinary practice, 
that the authorities, including the Superintendent and the majority of Dr. Butcher’s colleagues on 
the Board refused to compromise these norms indicates a refusal to accept that the challenge of 
integration before them was extraordinary, or black educational equality a goal worth disrupting 
comfortable, established administrative practice for. This adherence to viewing the status quo 
as organic and inherently virtuous, rather than as a reality and a system of norms and 
mechanisms specifically constructed and perpetuated in the context of white racial supremacy is 
one which also shaped further actions by the majority of the Board and superintendent towards 
desegregating the schools. 
 
Indeed, even by the start of the school year 1955-56, when Corning’s integration plan was 
administratively completed, the schools remained segregated and the program of desegregation 
remained gradual. Where previously only new pupils entering the school system would be 
assigned schools according to the new boundaries, from September 1955 all pupils entering a 
new level of the system- e.g. graduating from junior to senior high- would be allocated as 
such.227 Though admittedly a positive incremental step towards integration, this continued a 
gradualist approach whereby significant numbers of children would have to wait up to five years 
before being zoned to their newly zoned schools: tens of thousands continued to attend schools 
according to the old segregated boundaries. These multitude of administrative steps was 
viewed by parents and interested desegregationist parties as “unnecessarily slow and 
complicated”, according to Chris Asch and Derek Musgrove.228   A key further shift to be 
acknowledged was that from September 1955 the burden of accommodating optional transfers 
(those pupils who sought out of choice to move from their current school to their newly-zoned 
school) was shifted. In the previous year, such transfers were only possible provided it would 
not cause overcrowding. From September 1955 the case became that students wanting to 
attend their newly-zoned local school had priority over those already enrolled there but who 
lived outside the new zone when it came to avoiding overcrowding.229 However, as Irene 
Osborne observed that year in an assessment of the situation in The Journal of Negro 
Education, the burden of integration continued “to depend on positive action by parents and 
children to provide the initiative” and that many children remained assigned to their existing 
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schools on a “racial basis” because “they failed to comprehend the procedure of options”.230 By 
avoiding wholesale, automatic pupil shifts to ensure desegregation and instead providing simply 
‘options’ to switch to newly-zoned schools, Corning effectively abdicated the responsibility for 
desegregating the schools and imposed it upon individuals in the black community: on black 
parents having the time, administrative skills, and ability to navigate bureaucracy in order to get 
their children a fair schooling. In fact, even those who did manage to circumvent these 
administrative hurdles and request desegregatory transfers did not necessarily get them: in the 
1954-55 school year, only 900 of 2,400 option requests at the elementary level were granted, 
which likely further reduced the incentive for parents in following years to request them despite 
the shift in the burden of whether transferees or existing pupils took priority in the event of 
overcrowding.231 The very real impact of gradualism was thousands of children spending an 
extra one or more of their formative years in racially-assigned, inferior schools. 
 
In justifying this continued incrementalism in desegregating the schools, Corning expressed a 
key tenet of his educational philosophy as it related to desegregation, which essentially 
amounted to prioritising order over justice. Tellingly, when relaying his overarching principles for 
desegregation in the first Board meeting (25th May) after the court decisions , Corning stated 
that “the transition of a desegregated system is to be accomplished by natural and orderly 
means”, and that “artificial and immediate reassignments of large numbers of pupils… would be 
disruptive and should be avoided.”232 This idea of “naturalness” was the same approach the 
Superintendent had taken when opposing the transfer of buildings from white to black use under 
the dual-school system, and he continued to operate under these self-imposed limitations after 
the integration court decisions, to the advantage of whites and the disadvantage of blacks. Once 
again, in decrying any significant transfers of pupils as “disruptive”, Corning framed the existing 
situation which advantaged whites as an organic one, and any structural attempts to redress 
racial imbalance within that status quo as therefore “artificial”. The underlying assumption in all 
of this is inherent white racial supremacy; and it is to this supremacy- not white education per 
se- that large-scale transfers would have been “disruptive”.  This concept of the natural is one 
which can be tied to the same principles undergirding the ‘neighbourhood schools’ discourse 
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which was used to similar ends in limiting the effects of school desegregation on whites in 
‘Northern cities’ experiencing similar racial demographic shifts to D.C. 
 
In fact, the similarities between the District of Columbia in terms of its shifting racial makeup of 
its general population, and therefore its public school population, and the northern metropolises 
were recognised at the time by the school administrators. Carl Hansen, Assistant 
Superintendent at the time of desegregation, wrote just two years later comparing the shift 
towards drastically increased black enrollment in the D.C. public schools to that in Los Angeles 
and Chicago.233 In these cities, as in D.C., a reluctance to disrupt ‘naturalness’ was used as a 
way to frustrate real integration. In Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago, patterns of housing 
segregation resulting from government policy had led to largely monoracial neighbourhoods. As 
work from J.L Rury, Josh Sides, and Jeanne Theoharis amongst others have pointed out, the 
authorities in these cities implemented neighbourhood school policies not simply by 
coincidence, but explicitly to maintain a sense of natural community which was based entirely 
around racial exclusion.234 This was also the case in Washington, D.C.: though legal 
enforcement of restrictive racial covenants was made impossible by in Shelley v Kraemer 
(1948), they remained enforced in reality by the real estate and banking industries: in 1950, 
much housing in D.C. remained restricted to white use.235 Thus, a purely neighbourhood-based 
school zoning system coupled with deliberately constructed monoracial neighbourhoods in D.C., 
as in these other cities, led to little integration.236 Corning’s new attendance zones were based 
entirely on proximity of a child’s home to the school and failed to take into account any other 
factors or attempt to compensate for years of neglect of black children’s schooling. While school 
officials in Los Angeles later openly gerrymandered their school zones on an ongoing basis, and 
authorities in New York and Chicago continually refused to make theirs any more racially 
equitable as this would conflict with the neighbourhood schooling philosophy, D.C. officials 
acted similarly. 237 
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What is telling, however, of his continued adherence to these neighbourhood principles in 
service of white interests is Superintendent Corning’s insistence on the ability of pupils to be 
able to opt out of transfers. Corning insisted upon including an “escape” option in his integration 
plan. This option amounted to essentially allowing parents to opt-out of integration, and request 
that their child attend a school outside of their prescribed attendance zone. The Superintendent 
used the “laxness” of the Board, as characterised by Dr. Butcher, to take advantage of vague 
Board policy which entrusted great discretion to his expert educational judgement. Board 
members had approved in their own statement of principles that the Superintendent could make 
exceptions to the boundaries “for necessitous reasons or for the public convenience”, and 
further signed off on Corning’s own plan which stated that he had the authority to “take 
additional progressive steps as are consistent with the welfare of the children”.238 Corning and 
his administration took advantage of the discretion these vagueries afforded them by allowing 
pupils to switch schools to ones outside of their zone for reasons as fatuous and blatantly 
racially-coded as “emotional hardship”.239 Further, they even allowed pupils to switch in cases 
where the pupil “was among a very small minority in the school and the parent applied for relief”: 
an absurdity in the context of desegregation which created a clear logical impasse. If white 
pupils could opt-out of small-scale integration, but at the same time the administration had 
concretely ruled out any measures for large-scale integration, white parents had the power to 
stop integration entirely. Indeed, these opt-outs were almost entirely applied to whites. As then-
Assistant Superintendent Hansen pointed out: those who applied for these ‘escape’ clauses 
were “a number of white parents”.240 These ‘escape’ options also represented an exception of 
double standards to the neighbourhood school philosophy which benefited whites and 
disadvantaged blacks. Maintaining “naturalness” was given as the reason for not allowing black 
children to transfer to schools outside of their zoned school- which was likely to be a former 
Division II inferior (black) school- yet white pupils were allowed to transfer out of these 
neighbourhood zones on an emotional whim. While theoretically black students could also take 
advantage of the options and request a transfer, they did not have access to the same 
arguments to justify them as whites. Any black student requesting a transfer to what were on 
 
238 For Butcher’s “laxness” characterisation, see: Meeting minutes of the Board of Education, 23rd June 
1954, p.53;  For the Statement of Principles, see: Report of the Special Committee on Integration, May 
25th 1954, p. 13; for approval of discretion in Corning’s report, see: Meeting minutes of the Board of 
Education, 23rd June 1954, p. 49. 
239 Hansen, ‘The Miracle’, p. 51. 
240 Ibid, p. 50. 
72 
 
average newer, better-equipped majority-white schools outside of their zone would have been 
doing precisely the opposite of what the justifications for such transfers required: actively 
becoming part of a small minority at a largely monoracial school, rather than avoiding that exact 
scenario as in the rubric for justifying these transfers demanded. Further, as activists such as 
Julius Hobson have pointed out, black students were less able to take advantage of transfers to 
better, further away schools due to the financial costs of transportation.241 Indeed, a decade 
later in a Court case relating to a pupil tracking system, a federal judge concluded that options 
were deliberately and explicitly established “to permit white children to ‘escape’ from 
predominantly negro schools”.242 Thus, as Jeffrey Henig has mapped, in the five years after 
‘desegregation’, “none of the former Division 2 schools experienced more than minor 
integration”: they remained an average of over 97% black enrollment, with an average of fewer 
than fourteen white students each. Due to the one-way nature of these options, the burden of 
attending these inferior former-Division 2 schools was carried almost entirely by black students 
well beyond 1955.243  
 
That the D.C. school administrators’ aversion to any active steps toward racial integration was 
based in the naturalness of white superiority is further evidenced by the emergence of a similar 
“culturalist” discourse there, particularly in the aftermath of Corning’s desegregation program 
being implemented, as Jeanne Theoharis has pointed out was present in the northern 
metropolises.244 In order to explain the disparity between black and white achievement which 
was immediately obvious in a system whose administration was integrated and centralised, the 
school authorities fell back upon racist and white-supremacist arguments of cultural deprivation 
amongst black children, rather than the obvious deficit in the quality of the education they had 
hitherto received. The “naturalist” attitude which inspired the lack of integratory administrative 
action was exemplified further here, as the Superintendent refused to consider the impact of 
structurally racist schooling practices, instead concluding that black underachievement in D.C. 
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was the natural result of black children growing up in “a cultural Siberia”.245 Further, not only did 
Corning absolve his own administrative decisions’ contributions to black underachievement but 
actively attempted to laud them as the reason black children had made any academic 
achievements at all, claiming “it is a wonder that Negro children who have so little in their homes 
have gained so much in school.” 246 The evident entrenchment of these ideas amongst the 
administrators of the school system would go on to be channeled into a pupil tracking system in 
the public schools implemented under Corning’s Assistant Superintendent and successor, Carl 
Hansen, in 1958. Once again, this mirrored events in similar cities such as Los Angeles, where 
a similar tracking system was implemented.247 
 
The Track system’s roots were laid by Hansen himself while still Assistant Superintendent in 
1956, almost immediately after the implementation of the desegregation plan. It is clear from an 
analysis of the racial makeup of each of the different tracks in September 1956- a document 
which was at the time confidential and unable to be scrutinised by the public or advocates for 
equality- that the track system was in its manifestation segregation by another name. Hansen 
explicitly linked it to segregation, framing it as the “Big Solution” to the problems of 
desegregation.248 Pupils were tracked into one of four streams- Honors, College Preparatory, 
General, or Basic- according to academic ability, as judged by standardised test scores. In the 
first year of the track system, in which it was rolled out only at the Senior High level, there were 
1,921 white students (38%) and 3,178 black students (62%) in the Senior High schools. Despite 
this, white students made up a combined 73% of the top two tracks- Honors and College 
Preparatory, while black students made up a staggering 89% of the Basic track which in 
Hansen’s own words was for “stupid” children who were not to “aspire towards higher education 
and professional careers”. 249 It was clear duplicitousness then, likely due to the necessary 
political optics, that Hansen claimed throughout his tenure that the Track system was working 
and proclaimed his satisfaction that “the bright child will not be brought down by lagging 
students'' despite the fact that re-testing was only done every three years, effectively consigning 
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pupils to their initially assigned track and thus disadvantaging from the outset black pupils who 
had received inferior educations.250  
 
Ultimately, more than a decade after the Track system’s implementation, a federal court ruled in 
Hobson vs. Hansen (1967) that the tracking system, along with the options put in place in the 
desegregation plan, constituted a violation of black students’ constitutional rights to equal 
education. While the Court stopped short of excoriating this as deliberate segregation, and 
agreed that the officials “sincerely believed in the neighbourhood school policy” despite its 
segregatory outcomes in an increasingly residentially-segregated city, it was equally “impossible 
not to assume that the school administration is affirmatively satisfied with the segregation which 
the neighbourhood policy breeds”.251 However, given the cumulative effects of these authorities’ 
actions before, during, and after ‘desegregation’, which consistently benefited whites over 
blacks, it is impossible to conclude anything other than the fact that such actions were 
intentional, and though a belief in naturalness and neighbourhood schools may well have been 
earnest, it was one which complemented rather than disproved this racist intent. The court also 
saw it necessary to step in and order the active integratory measures, such as the option of 
busing for black students as courts would similarly do in Northern cities such as Boston, which 
the Superintendent and Board had failed to implement in their so-called desegregation plan over 
a decade earlier. 252 253 
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VI: The Impact and Import of the Deliberate Continuation of Public School 
Segregation in Washington, D.C. 
 
The first purpose of this piece is to demonstrate decisively that despite the Bolling decision and 
a racially-liberal rhetorical patina from those in administrative power, Washington D.C.’s schools 
never integrated. Though authorities attempted to manipulate the data by using statistics such 
as the number of pupils attending integrated schools or the number of schools with both black 
and white pupils to show otherwise, these were substantively poor measures of integration. The 
latter statistic, for example, showed that 116 of 163 schools in September 1954, rising to 139 
out of 163 in 1956, had some level of both black and white enrollment .254 However the numbers 
of black children in the white schools supposedly making them “integrated” were miniscule: only 
twenty-nine of these schools in September 1954 had a minority enrollment greater than 20%.255  
 
Further, the conditions created by the authorities’ neighbourhood school zoning and optional 
transfers created a situation in which whites could continue to resegregate themselves in the 
context of white flight. As Jeffrey Henig has demonstrated, around two-thirds of the formerly-
white schools experienced “significant racial turnover” in the years following desegregation, this 
was due to whites fleeing and ceding them to black use. A snapshot of these schools might 
show some reasonable levels of integration in, say, 1956, but by 1960 the process of racial 
inversion had been completed and these two-thirds of formerly-white schools were almost 
entirely black, while the other third remained almost entirely white.256 White parents were using 
the mechanisms established in the desegregation plan to avoid integration in a dynamic way. 
The almost total lack of backlash to desegregation, which Hansen admitted was carried out 
“smoothly” should not be read as an achievement of the administrators but rather a symptom of 
the fact that little had changed.257 Just as in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and other cities 
affected by the same racial demographic shifts, a refusal to actively integrate the schools 
undergirded by a ‘neighbourhood schools’ policy and an underlying belief in white supremacy as 
natural facilitated the continuation of racially-segregated schooling. The school authorities at no 
point made any attempt at true integration. 
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256 Henig, ‘Patterns of School-Level Racial Change in D.C.’, p. 451. 
257 Hansen, ‘The Miracle’, pp. 49-50. 
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Secondly, this piece seeks to contribute to the plethora of recent scholarship dismantling of the 
“Myth of Southern Exceptionalism”, while suggesting a renewed point of focus for future study 
on the metropolis as a key unit of analysis within this field. It argues that Washington, D.C.’s 
response to court-ordered desegregation as being one of superficial compliance which 
maintained the racially hierarchical status quo in its public schooling was not an artefact of its 
“northernness”, “southernness”, or indeed its liminality. Rather, that the ongoing segregation of 
the races in the public schools of the nation’s capital was the result of its Americanness.  
 
D.C., alongside the other cities compared to it in this piece, is often considered a temple of 
American liberalism. When Eisenhower declared that he wanted D.C. to be a “showpiece for the 
nation” with regards to school desegregation he was, sadly and perhaps inadvertently, 
prescient.258 In the end, D.C. was indeed a showpiece for the nation for how to effectively evade 
true integration while patting itself on the back for its efforts. Eisenhower’s expression that D.C. 
should lead the way in desegregation, while doing little to exert any of the actual authority he 
had over municipal authorities in the city to do so, is perhaps a microcosmic display of the 
vacuity of much white liberal elite thought. Words did little when actions perpetuated the status 
quo. In fact, as Chris Myers Asch and George Derek Musgrove pointed out in their recent book 
Chocolate City, “liberal white supporters of school desegregation often took their children out of 
the public schools” and “wanted none of it”. Superintendent Hansen himself openly admitted 
that he would rather his children attended a school where they were the predominant race. 259 
While Myers and Asch were only able to donate a few pages to highlighting these attitudinal 
tendencies of the liberal white elite in their sprawling history of D.C., this piece seeks to examine 
with much more granularity the actions of these hyperlocal administrators. In assessing their 
attitudes, priorities, and incentives, this piece not only underscores the presence of these 
attitudes amongst liberal elite whites, but crucially how these attitudes were consistently 
directed into policymaking and the implementation of “desegregation” to preserve the separation 
of the races in public schools. The evidence and arguments proffered seek to draw a fine, bright 
and fresh line of causation between these attitudes and resultant consistent, deliberate, and 
racist policy outcomes.  
 
Rather than contradicting the liberal American concepts of “neighbourhood schools” and 
“freedom of choice”, the inferior education of black children in the public school system was 
 
258 Nichols, ‘Showpiece of Our Nation’. 
259 Asch and Musgrove, Chocolate City, p. 316. 
77 
 
integral to their perpetuation. In the context of the capital district, as elsewhere, “neighbourhood 
schooling” meant monochromatic schooling, as white flight combined with decades of racist 
government housing policy created and maintained segregated neighbourhoods, as was 
highlighted by the judge in Hobson vs. Hansen. Similarly, “freedom of choice” meant giving 
those with the means to do so- wealthy whites- the “choice” of opting out of integration 
altogether, stranding black children in inferior schools with no mechanism of escape. 
Superintendent Corning’s “Desegregation Plan” institutionally entrenched this with its system of 
“options”. White freedom, as so often had been the case throughout American history, was zero 
sum. It came at the expense of black opportunity.  
 
As such, while undergirding the literature espousing the national nature of race relations and 
white supremacy (rather than its mythical exceptional southernness), this piece also seeks to 
contribute to an emerging field within this arena of study. That is, metropolitanism. Washington, 
D.C.’s response to court-ordered desegregation was essentially the same as any other 
American place experiencing similar migration patterns and concomitant shifts in racial 
demographics. This is not to say, of course, that every place in American responded in precisely 
the same way to school desegregation orders, but that the way places responded was not in 
any meaningful way because of their geographic location beyond that of being in the United 
States. As earlier elucidated, the cities at this time experiencing such significant migration 
dynamics- namely significant numbers of black Americans moving there- were the northern 
metropolises. Hence, their rhetorical and political responses were broadly similar. As the work of 
Jeanne Theoharis and others has highlighted out in Chicago and in New York, authorities in 
these large northern cities paid lip service to vague liberal ideas of equality and racial equity 
while not just doing nothing to achieve these goals, but actively hindering them. The clear 
pattern in these cities, now bolstered by the example of Washington, D.C. provided herein, 
compels further study of the metropolis as a unit of analysis to expand upon this body of 
evidence, to enable more sturdy comparisons to be drawn and provide greater insight into the 
urban grassroots of American racism. Each further study at the hyperlocal municipal level 
provides a data point to facilitate analysis across traditional (and often artificial) historiographical 
divides, such as regionalism. In this sense, such studies of metropolitanism are an essential 
part of the ongoing attempts to dismantle the Myth of Southern Exceptionalism. The conclusions 
drawn in this study are evidence of the fruitfulness of placing a city’s ostensible liberal 
metropolitanism front and centre as a driving force behind its patterns of racism, rather than 
viewing the two things as discordant and setting out to explain any apparent contradiction 
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between them. In any further study, historians should endeavour to treat the metropolises’ 
espoused and vaunted liberalism not as incidental to their racist public policy, but rather at the 
very core of it.   
 
In the first instance, policies related to school desegregation enacted in D.C. and other northern 
metropolises might appear different to “southern” states or municipalities. While this may be the 
case on a superficial level, these policies all shared a single universal, fundamental purpose: to 
maintain racially separate schools. One useful and demonstrative comparison is to the Stanley 
Plan, enacted in Virginia in the exact same month, September 1956, which Corning’s 
“Desegregation Plan” came into effect in D.C. These two plans were rhetorically extremely 
different in their presentation and politicking to appeal to necessary constituencies- the Virginian 
elite who had committed itself to “Massive Resistance” and the D.C. elite who had committed 
itself to racial equity right up to the point of their own inconvenience. Those proposing the 
Stanley Plan were overt in their intent to defy the court order as part of a wide campaign of 
“Massive Resistance”, whereas the D.C. Board of Education moved swiftly to accept it and set 
the wheels in motion for a “desegregation plan” under the Superintendent of Schools.260 
However, the mechanisms put in place by these two plans were remarkably similar. Where, as 
earlier outlined, the D.C. plan’s system of “options” essentially allowed whites to opt out of going 
to school with blacks, the Stanley Plan provided that “no child be required to attend a school 
wherein both white and colored children are taught and… the parents of those children who 
object to integrated schools”.261 In function, these plans were similar. Unsurprisingly and, 
crucially, uncoincidentally, these plans produced similar outcomes. Both systems remained 
segregated by any meaningful definition.  
 
The conclusion that rhetoric and framing of respective desegregation plans was ultimately 
immaterial given that these had similar outcomes and in fact, on many levels, similar intent, is 
not some fundamentalist philosophical exercise or lazy abandonment of nuance. Rather, it is to 
highlight the very real destructive legacy of school segregation which continues to blight the 
chances of black children in America’s cities, none more so than in Washington, D.C, that 
shining city on a hill. 
 
260 Titus, Brown’s Battleground.  
261 Garland Gray, ‘Report of the Commission to the Governor of Virginia’, (Richmond: Commonwealth of 
Virginia Division of Purchase and Printing, 1955), 
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